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PART B: DECARBONISATION SCENARIOS

1. ASSUMPTIONS

1.1 Macroeconomic and demographic assumptions

On the basis of the European Council's objective for EU decarbonisation of at least 80% below 1990 by 2050 in the context of necessary reductions by developed countries as a group¹ it is assumed that competitiveness effects throughout decarbonisation would be rather limited. Therefore, the decarbonisation scenarios are based on the same demographic and macroeconomic assumptions as the Reference scenario and Current Policy Initiatives scenario. Such an assumption also facilitates comparison of the energy results across scenarios. These macro-economic (sectoral production) assumptions also hold for energy intensive industries. However, under fragmented action, measures against carbon leakage may be necessary. The analysis of this particular case (see below) deals with energy and emission effects of such measures, but does not address potential changes in sectoral production levels under fragmented action. The aim of measures against carbon leakage is indeed to avoid such relocation of energy intensive production.

1.2 Energy import prices


The decarbonisation scenarios are based on "global climate action" price trajectories for oil, gas and coal² reflecting that global action on decarbonisation will reduce fossil fuel demand worldwide and will therefore have a downward effect on fossil fuel prices. Oil, gas and coal prices are therefore lower than in the Reference scenario and Current Policy Initiative scenario. Their trajectories are an outcome of the global analysis in the Low carbon Economy Roadmap, which is similar to recent IEA projections that assessed the impacts of ambitious climate policies³.

¹ European Council, 29/30 October 2009.

² See Impact assessment accompanying Communication on Low Carbon Economy Roadmap SEC(2011)288

³ International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009, Energy Technology Perspectives 2010

Figure 18: Fossil fuel prices in the decarbonisation scenarios



1.3 Policy assumptions

In addition to policy assumptions in the Current Policy Initiatives scenario, the following policies and measures were added to scenarios:

Table 15 Measures included in all decarbonisation scenarios

1	Climate policies for respecting carbon constraints to reach 85% energy related CO ₂ reductions by 2050 (40% by 2030), consistent with 80% reduction of total GHG emissions according to the "Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050" (including achievement of cumulative carbon cap) in a cost effective way	Supplementary to specific energy policies in the scenario, ETS prices and carbon values for non ETS sectors are determined in such a way as to reach the 2050 reduction goal; ETS and non ETS sectors use equal carbon prices/values (from 2025 onwards); cumulative emissions are similar across scenarios
2	Stronger RES facilitation policies	Represented by higher RES-values in the model. These facilitating RES policies include for example the availability of more sites for RES, easier licensing of RES installations, greater acceptance and support deriving from the improvement of local economies and industrial development; operational aids remain at the same level as in the REF/CPI scenarios.
3	Transport measures	Energy efficiency standards, internal market, infrastructure, pricing and transport planning measures leading to more fuel-efficient transport means and some modal shift Encourage the deployment of clean energy carriers by establishing the necessary supporting infrastructures ⁴

⁴ The decarbonisation scenarios reflect the transport policy measures included in the White Paper "Roadmap to a Single Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system" (COM (2011) 144) with highest impact on energy demand in transport.

4	Guarantee funds for all low carbon generation technologies	The model reflects support to <u>early</u> demonstration and <u>first of a kind commercial plants</u> for all innovative low-carbon technologies in the energy sector (nuclear, RES and their infrastructure needs, CCS, etc.).
5	Storage and interconnections	Higher penetration of variable generation leading occasionally to excess electricity is dealt with by increased pump storage and more interconnection capacity. Moreover, large parts of such excess electricity generation from variable sources is transformed into hydrogen, which is fed, up to a certain degree, into the natural gas grid, thereby providing a means for (indirect) storage of electricity and reducing the carbon content of gas delivered to final consumers enabling deeper emission cuts. Where for technical or economic reasons, simulated in the model, feeding into the natural gas grid is not feasible, excess electricity (mainly from RES) is stored in form of hydrogen at times of excess supply and transformed back into electricity when demand exceeds supply. (Hydrogen storage is used to a different degree in various decarbonisation scenarios, see also measures under Scenario 4).

Scenario 2: High energy efficiency

This scenario is driven by a political commitment of very high primary energy savings by 2050. It includes a very stringent implementation of the Energy Efficiency Plan and aims at reaching close to 20% energy savings by 2020. Strong energy efficiency policies are also pursued thereafter.

Table 16 Policies/measures included (in addition to measures in table 15):

	Measure	How it is reflected in the model
1	Additional strong minimum requirements for appliances	Progressive adaptation of modelling parameters for different product groups. As requirements concern only new products, the effect will be gradual.
2	High renovation rates for existing buildings due to better/more financing and planned obligations for public buildings (more than 2% refurbishment per year)	Change of drivers (ESCOs, energy utilities obligation, energy audits) influence stock – flow parameters in the model reflecting higher renovation rates (higher than 2% pa), with account being taken of tougher requirements for public sector through specific treatment of the non-market services sector
3	Passive houses standards after 2020	All new houses after 2020 comply with passive house standards - around 20-50 KWh/m ² (depending on the country) which might to a large extent be of renewable origin
4	Marked penetration of ESCOs and higher financing availability	Enabling role of ESCOs is reflected in lower discount rates for household consumers (from 17.5% to 16% in 2015, 14% in 2020, 13% in 2025 and 12% from 2030 onwards) and for industry, agriculture and services (from 12% to 11% by 2015 and to 10% from 2020 onwards)
5	Obligation of utilities to achieve energy savings in their customers' energy use over 1.5% per year (up to 2020)	Induce more energy efficiency mainly in residential and tertiary sectors by imposing an efficiency value for grid bound energy sources

		(electricity, gas, heat)
6	Strong minimum requirements for energy generation, transmission and distribution including obligation that <u>existing</u> energy generation installations are upgraded to the BAT every time their permit needs to be updated	Higher efficiency of power plants through removing less efficient items from the generation portfolio, allowing however for efficiency losses where CCS is deployed Less transmission and distribution losses
7	Full roll-out of smart grids, smart metering	Enabling more efficiency and decentralised RES; Reflected as costs in the distribution grid costs, electricity prices and overall costs of the energy system
8	Significant RES highly decentralised generation	More advanced power dispatching and ancillary services to support reliability of power supply Higher penetration of small wind, solar and hydro

Scenario 3: Diversified supply technologies scenario

This option is mainly driven by carbon prices and carbon values (equal for ETS and non ETS sectors). Carbon values are a still undefined proxy for policy measures that bring about emission reduction. They do not represent a cost to economic actors outside EU ETS (where they coincide with the EU ETS price), but are economic drivers that change decision making of the modelled agents. Yet, the changes triggered by carbon values may entail costs (e.g. for investment in energy savings or for fuel switching), which are accounted for in the modelling framework. They are applied to all sectors and greenhouse gas emissions, covering ETS and Non ETS sectors. As economic drivers, they influence technology choices and demand behaviour. Their respective level is not an assumption but a result of the modelling depending among other things on the level of ambition in GHG reduction. The modelling applies equal carbon values across sectors and ensures thereby efficient reductions across sectors.

This option assumes acceptance of nuclear and CCS and development of RES facilitation policies. It reproduces the "Effective and widely accepted technologies" scenario used in the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap and Roadmap on Transport on the basis of scenario 1bis.

Table 17 Policies/measures included (in addition to measures in table 15):

	Measure	How it is reflected in the model
1	MS and investors have confidence in CCS as a credible and commercially viable technology; acceptance of storage and CO2 networks is high	
2	MS, investors and society at large have confidence in nuclear as safety is considered adequate and waste issues are solved	Applicable for all countries that have not ruled out the use of nuclear, i.e. Germany and Belgium for the longer term and the currently non-nuclear countries except for Poland

Scenario 4: High RES

This scenario aims at achieving very high overall RES share and very high RES penetration in power generation (around 90% share and close to 100% related to final consumption). Recalling security of supply objectives, this would be based on increasing domestic RES supply including off-shore wind from the North Sea; significant CSP and storage development, increased heat pump penetration for heating and significant micro power generation (PV, small scale wind, etc.). Regarding assumptions for the demand sectors,

scenario 4 is similar to scenario 3, with the exception that RES are more intensively facilitated.

Table 18 Policies/measures included (in addition to measures in table 15):

	Measure	How it is reflected in the model
1	Facilitation and enabling policies (permitting, preferential access to the grid)	Represented by significantly higher RES-values in the model than in other decarbonisation scenarios; these RES facilitating policies include for example lower lead times in construction, and involve greater progress on learning curves (e.g. small scale PV and wind) based on higher production.
2	Market integration allowing for more RES trade	Use of cooperation mechanisms or convergent support schemes coupled with declining costs/support result in optimal allocation of RES development, depending also on adequate and timely expansion of interconnection capacity (point 4);
3	Stronger policy measures in the power generation, heating and transport sectors in order to achieve high share of RES in overall energy consumption in particular in household micro power generation and increased power production at the distribution level.	Higher use of heat pumps, significant penetration of passive houses with integrated RES reflected through faster learning rates (cost reductions), higher penetration rates (e.g. due to RES building/refurbishing requirements)
4	Infrastructure, back-up, storage and demand side management	Substantial increase in interconnectors and higher net transfer capacities including DC lines from North Sea to the centre of Europe. Back-up functions done by biomass and gas fired plants. Sufficient storage capacity is provided (pumped storage, CSP, hydrogen). Smart metering allows time and supply situation dependent electricity use (peak/off-peak) reducing needs for storing variable RES electricity. All these measures allow for exploiting greater potentials for off-shore wind in the North Sea.

Scenario 5: Delayed CCS

The delayed CCS scenario shows consequences of a delay in the development of CCS, reflecting acceptance difficulties for CCS regarding storage sites and transport; large scale development of CCS is therefore assumed feasible only after 2040.

Table 19 Policies/measures included (in addition to measures in table 15):

	Measure	How it is reflected in the model
1	Acceptance difficulties for CCS regarding storage sites and transport, which allow large scale development only after 2040.	Shift of cost-potential curves to the left (higher costs reflecting delays and public opposition). The learning curve for CCS is also delayed accordingly, resulting in higher capital costs for CCS than in scenario 3
2	MS , investors and society at large have confidence in nuclear as safety is considered adequate and waste issues are solved	Low risk premiums for nuclear Applicable for all countries that have not ruled out the use of nuclear, i.e. Germany and Belgium for the longer term and the currently non-nuclear countries except for Poland

Scenario 6: Low nuclear

This scenario shows consequences of a low public acceptance of nuclear power plants leading to cancellation of investment projects that are currently under consideration and no life time extension after 2030. This leads to higher deployment of the substitute technologies CCS from fossil fuels on economic grounds.

Table 20 Policies/measures included (in addition to measures in table 15):

	Measure	How it is reflected in the model
1	Political decisions based on perceived risks associated with waste and safety (especially in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident) leading to no new nuclear plants being build besides the ones presently under construction: 1600 MWe in Finland, 2x1600 MWe in France and 2x505 MWe in Slovakia. Moreover, the recourse to deciding instead on nuclear lifetime extension is available only up to 2030.	No extension of nuclear lifetime on economic grounds after 2030 No new nuclear plants are being built besides reactors under construction : 1600 MW in FIN; 2*1600 MW in FR and 2*505 MW in SK
2	MS and investors have confidence in CCS as a credible and commercially viable technology; acceptance of storage and CO2 networks is high	Low risk premiums for CCS

1.4 Assumptions about energy infrastructure development

Infrastructure modelling for decarbonisation scenarios was done similarly to the approach described in Part A, section 1.4 for the Reference and Current Policy initiatives scenarios.

For decarbonisation scenarios the analysis done showed that except for very high RES penetration, the 2020 interconnection capacity would allow for most intra-EU electricity trade provided that some bottlenecks would be dealt with. The identified bottlenecks concerns interconnections around Germany, in Austria-Italy-Slovenia, Balkans and Denmark-Sweden. Greater investment and capacity for these specific links were assumed.

For very high RES penetration, which involves much more RES based electricity trade, stronger growth of interconnection capacity will be required. Under the assumptions of this scenario, full exploitation of off-shore wind potential at North Sea is foreseen. It is assumed that a dense DC interconnection system will develop mainly offshore but also partly onshore, to facilitate power flows from the North Sea offshore wind parks to consumption centres. In this scenario, the links of Sweden with Poland, Sweden with Lithuania, Austria with Italy, France with Italy and links in the Balkan region appear to be congested and need to be reinforced mainly with DC lines.

For more details on the modelling approach and results see Attachment 2.

1.5 Technology assumptions

Many technology assumptions are the same as in the Reference scenario and Current Policy Initiatives scenario (with revised assumptions about nuclear). In the decarbonisation scenarios, however, there are additional features and mechanisms that produce high decarbonisation and technology penetration.

Whereas all decarbonisation scenarios rely on technologies that exist today, they might become commercially mature only over time supported also by decarbonisation requirements. The uptake of the technologies is endogenous in the scenarios with their large-scale deployment leading to lower cost and higher performance, which correspond to a fully mature commercial stage.

All scenarios simulate merit order dispatching for power generation with contribution of variable generation from renewables. Electricity balancing and reliability is ensured endogenously by various means such as import and export flows (in case of high RES it is facilitated by expanding interconnections), investment in flexible thermal units, pumped storage and if required hydrogen based storage. In this latter case, excess variable generation from RES at times of lower demand may be used to produce hydrogen via electrolysis which is then used to produce electricity in turbine based power plants when electricity demand exceeds production from RES and other available sources (e.g. in situations of high demand).

The modelling approach also considers the possibility to mix hydrogen produced through electrolysis in the low and medium pressure natural gas distribution system (up to 30%) in order to reduce the average emission factor of the supplied blend, thereby contributing to the decarbonisation of final energy consumption.

Photovoltaic in High RES Scenario evolves along more optimistic trajectories than in the Reference scenario, as it is presumed that the higher penetration of the technology leads to stronger learning by doing. The higher uptake of RES technologies is driven mainly by the lower cost potentials for RES power, which are due to policies facilitating access to resources and sites.

A further change is in the Delayed CCS scenario where the development of CCS is delayed, and does not reach the same levels of development as in the other scenarios.

There is also faster progress in energy efficiency related technologies due to bigger scale and carbon prices effects. The energy technologies on the demand side follow a different development from the Reference scenario variants. In any situation there are different choices to consumers regarding the energy performance of appliances, buildings and equipment (evident from e.g. energy labelling where such transparency is provided by legislation). In decarbonisation scenarios, there are stronger shifts towards the more efficient technology vintages, which improve the average energy efficiency of a given energy use (e.g. of the average lighting appliance) compared to the Reference scenario variants. Energy efficiency progress is therefore supported by consumer choice effects similar to increased learning by doing driven by consumers opting for the more efficient available technologies.

The assumptions on the battery costs for the transport sector were developed along the lines of the White Paper on a Roadmap to a Single Transport Area. Efficiency improvements of ICE vehicles also occur in response to carbon values, making the overall vehicle fleet more efficient than in the Reference scenario and its variants. However, the following decarbonisation scenarios do not produce the same energy related transport outcome due to the fact that these scenarios do not handle the same transport details and that the overall framework conditions are different according to the scenario. In particular, the penetration of some alternative propulsion technologies (electric vehicles, hydrogen, etc.) might be somewhat different.

1.6 Drivers

An internal greenhouse gas emission reduction contribution of around 80% in 2050 is taken as the key constraint for exploring different scenarios. To ensure that decarbonisation efforts are comparable across options and scenarios, the equalisation of cumulative emissions across scenarios is used as an additional constraint, underlining the importance of the climate impacts of cumulative emissions over the whole period until 2050 (and beyond). The corresponding decarbonisation effort from energy related CO₂ emissions is 85% CO₂ reductions compared to 1990, as demonstrated by the modelling underlying the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap of March 2011.

Common carbon values applied to all sectors and greenhouse gas emissions, covering ETS and Non ETS sectors, are used as key driver to reach the emission reductions and to ensure cost efficient reductions across sectors. As economic drivers, they influence technology choices and demand behaviour, in addition to the energy policies mirrored in the various scenarios for the Energy Roadmap. The respective level of carbon values is not an assumption but a result of the modelling.

Another important driver concerns international energy prices. Given that these scenarios assume global action, significantly lower fossil fuel prices are assumed than those in the reference and Current Policy Initiatives scenarios. Their order of magnitude has been set at a similar level as the results of the global analysis done for the Low Carbon economy Roadmap and recent IEA projections which assessed the impacts of ambitious climate policies.

To increase the penetration of renewable energy sources the RES-value was increased compared to the Reference scenario. In 2050, the RES-value in the decarbonisation scenarios is twice as high as in the current trend cases: instead of 35 €MWh in Reference and CPI it amounts to 71 €MWh in all decarbonisation scenarios, except for the high RES scenario, in which RES support is much more pronounced (RES-value of 382 €MWh). The RES-value is a modelling tool used to reflect the marginal value of not explicitly modelled facilitation RES policies. These facilitating RES policies include for example the availability of more sites for RES, easier licensing of RES installations, benefits deriving from the improvement of local economies and industrial development. In High RES scenario the RES-value is the shadow value associated with the additional target of maximisation of the RES share in power generation and in the overall energy mix.

2. RESULTS

2.1 Overview: outcome for the four main strategic directions to decarbonisation

Decarbonisation can be achieved through energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear or CCS. Pursuing each of these main directions can bring the energy system a long way towards the decarbonisation objective of reducing energy related CO₂ emissions by 85% below 1990 by 2050. The policy options (scenarios) proposed explore 5 different combinations of the four decarbonisation options. Decarbonisation options are never explored in isolation as interaction of different elements will necessarily be included in any scenario that evaluates the entire energy system. Moreover, the climate change issue is about atmospheric concentrations of GHG, i.e. with the long lifetimes of gases involved it is essentially about cumulative emissions. All scenarios achieve also the same level of cumulative GHG emissions. This makes energy, environmental and economic impacts comparable across the scenarios.

Energy Efficiency

Energy Efficiency is a key ingredient in all the decarbonisation pathways examined. Its contribution is most important in the Energy Efficiency scenario (Scenario 2). Energy savings in 2050 from 2005 (virtually the peak energy consumption year) amount to 41%, while GDP more than doubles over the same period of time (+104%). The lowest contribution from energy efficiency towards decarbonisation comes in the Delayed CCS scenario, having a high nuclear contribution, in which primary energy consumption declines 32% between 2005 and 2050. As GDP does not change between scenarios, these energy savings from 2005 are entirely due to energy efficiency gains in a broad sense (including structural change), but not involving income losses.

In the Energy Efficiency scenario, one unit of GDP in 2050 requires 71% less energy input than in 2005. The average annual improvement in energy intensity (primary energy consumption / GDP) amounts to 2.7% pa, which is almost a doubling from historical trends (1.4% pa in 1990 to 2005 including the major efficiency raising restructuring in former centrally planned economies). All the decarbonisation scenarios have energy intensity improvements around 2.5% pa given e.g. synergies between energy efficiency and RES.

Energy savings in the High RES scenario are almost as high as in the Energy Efficiency case (minus 38% for energy consumption in 2050 compared to 2005 instead of minus 41%), this is however achieved by different means: the energy efficiency scenario focuses on direct impacts on final demand, whereas energy savings in the high RES case come largely through highly efficient RES technologies replacing less efficient nuclear and fossil fuel technologies.

A clear result concerning the strategic energy efficiency direction is that a substantial speeding up of energy efficiency improvements from historical trends is crucial for achieving the decarbonisation objective.

RES

RES, too, are a key ingredient in any decarbonisation strategy. The RES share in gross final energy consumption (i.e. the definition for the existing 20% target) rises to at least 55% in 2050.

In the High RES scenario the RES share in gross final energy consumption reaches 75%, up 65 percentage points from current levels. The RES share in transport increases to 73%. The RES share in power generation reaches 86%. RES in electricity consumption account for even 97% given that electricity consumption calculated in line with the procedure for the calculation of the overall RES share excludes losses related to pump storage and hydrogen storage of electricity, the latter being necessary to accommodate all the available RES electricity in particular at times when electricity demand is lower than RES generation.

The second highest RES contribution (58%) materialises in the Low nuclear scenario. The RES share is also rather high under strong energy efficiency policies (57%).

The High RES scenario is the most challenging scenario regarding the restructuring of the energy system including major investments in power generation with RES capacity in 2050 reaching over 1900 GW, which is more than 8 times the current RES capacity and also more than twice today's total generation capacity (including nuclear, all fossil fuels and RES) (for more details see under power generation)

Nuclear

There is also a rather wide range with regard to the contribution of nuclear towards decarbonisation. The nuclear share is highest in the scenario that models the delayed availability of CCS (Scenario 4), given in particular issues arising with transport and storage of CO₂ and has no additional policies on renewables and energy efficiency giving rise to an 18% share for nuclear in primary energy demand in 2050, which is 4 percentage points more than is projected under Current Policy Initiatives.

Least use of the nuclear option is made in the Low Nuclear Scenario (Scenario 6), which mirrors a hypothetical Europe-wide sceptical approach to nuclear deployment and investment. This scenario has still a nuclear share in primary energy of 3% in 2050 for reaching 85% CO₂ reduction in 2050 similar to all the other decarbonisation scenarios.

The Diversified supply technology scenario (the other scenario, in which technologies compete on their economic merits alone) for reaching decarbonisation has a nuclear share in 2050 of 16% despite of nuclear phase-out in some Member States, which is still slightly higher than the current share. The High RES scenario would leave only little room for nuclear, bringing its share down to 4% in primary energy supply.

CCS

The energy contribution of CCS towards decarbonisation is contingent upon the level of fossil fuel consumption⁵ in sufficiently large units to justify economically the deployment of this technology. Hence the CCS share in e.g. gross electricity generation is limited by the degree of energy efficiency and decentralisation of energy supply as well as by the level of RES and nuclear penetration.

The highest share of CCS materialises in the Low Nuclear scenario (scenario 6). This case gives rise to a 32% share of CCS in gross electricity generation in 2050. CCS can substitute for nuclear in the case that this option was available only to a very limited extent. The CCS share would be particularly small in a scenario, in which almost all power generation stems from RES, i.e. Scenario 3, in which the CCS share drops to a mere 7%. The other scenarios have around 19-24% CCS share in gross electricity generation in 2050, with the lower end of the range stemming from delays in CCS technology introduction (mainly linked to storage issues).


Decarbonisation requires substantial progress on both energy intensity and carbon intensity

The 4 decarbonisation dimensions, explored in 5 decarbonisation scenarios, can also be expressed in terms of energy and carbon intensity. Energy efficiency reduces energy intensity (energy consumption divided by GDP) while the other three options (RES, nuclear and RES) impact overwhelmingly on carbon intensity (CO₂ divided by energy consumption). Substantial progress needs to be made on both indicators- energy and carbon intensity –

⁵ The discussion here does not deal with CCS used for mitigation of industrial process emissions that do not stem from fossil fuel burning. These considerations exclude also potential removal of CO₂ from the atmosphere through fitting CCS to biomass power plants, in which case the atmospheric removal of CO₂ during plant growth is not undone by later emissions of CO₂ from burning the biomass, with the CO₂ from biomass burning being stored instead.

which are to some degree substitutes for each other. The more successful policies to reduce energy consumption are the less needs to be done on fuel switching towards zero/low carbon energy sources, and vice versa⁶ (see Figure 19). The five decarbonisation scenarios show substantial improvements in energy intensity which sinks 67%-71% compared with 2005 and 73%-76% compared with the higher 1990 level in terms of energy intensity (1990 had lower energy consumption, but also much lower GDP). Fuel switching continues in the decarbonisation scenarios up to 2050 and carbon intensity would improve substantially falling 76%-78% from 1990 (73%-75% from 2005).


Figure 19: Decarbonisation scenarios: Improvements in carbon and energy intensities (reductions from 1990)



With ongoing economic growth, decarbonisation poses a formidable challenge given that meeting higher demand for energy services (heating and cooling, lighting, cooking, process energy, mobility, communication, etc) is part of increasing welfare. Upward pressure on energy consumption and CO₂ emissions from economic growth is substantial given that GDP might increase almost threefold between 1990 and 2050 (see figure 20). The 80% GHG reductions objective by 2050 will however require deep cuts into energy related CO₂ emissions, which in turn require energy consumption to decrease substantially as well.

Figure 20: Decarbonisation scenarios: development of GDP, primary energy consumption and energy related CO₂ emissions: 1990 = 100

⁶ In this respect, carbon intensity is a summary indicator for the fuel mix, while energy intensity captures the efficiency of energy consumption and the composition of economic activity (e.g. share of services versus (heavy) industry).



2.2 Energy consumption and supply structure

Primary energy consumption is significantly lower in all decarbonisation scenarios as compared to the Reference scenario. This is also true for the Current Policy Initiatives scenario that shows 6 and 8% lower demand in 2030 and 2050, respectively than in the Reference scenario reflecting effects of energy efficiency measures in the Energy Efficiency Plan. The biggest decline of primary energy consumption comes in Energy Efficiency scenario (-16% in 2030 and -38% in 2050) showing effects of stringent energy efficiency policies and smart grid deployment. Compared with the actual outcome for 2005, primary energy consumption shrinks by 41%. The decrease in energy consumption compared with Reference for the decarbonisation scenarios spans a range from 11% - 16% in 2030 and from 30% to 38% in 2050. Energy efficiency is therefore an essential building block in all decarbonisation scenarios.

Table 21: Total Primary energy consumption, changes compared to the Reference scenario


(Mtoe)	2020	2030	2050
Reference	1790	1729	1763
Current policy Initiatives	1700	1629	1615
<i>% difference to Reference</i>	-5.0%	-5.8%	-8.4%
Energy efficiency	1644	1452	1084
<i>% difference to Reference</i>	-8.1%	-16.0%	-38.5%
Diversified supply technologies	1681	1534	1217
<i>% difference to Reference</i>	-6.1%	-11.3%	-31.0%
High RES	1679	1510	1134
<i>% difference to Reference</i>	-6.2%	-12.7%	-35.7%
Delayed CCS	1682	1532	1238
<i>% difference to Reference</i>	-6.1%	-11.4%	-29.8%
Low nuclear	1687	1489	1137
<i>% difference to Reference</i>	-5.8%	-13.9%	-35.5%

It is important to note that these levels of reduced primary energy demand do not come from reduced activity levels (which remains the same across all scenarios). Instead they are mainly the result of technological changes on the demand and also supply side: from more efficient buildings, appliances, heating systems and vehicles and from electrification in transport and heating, which combines very efficient demand side technologies (plug-in hybrids, electric vehicles and heat pumps) with a largely decarbonised power sector. Some changes related especially to fuel switching also contribute to reducing primary energy demand, such as switching from lignite or nuclear power generation to gas or wind based electricity production, which is associated with higher conversion efficiencies. In addition, behavioural change, triggered by e.g. changes in prices, information, energy saving obligations, etc, contributes to better energy efficiency.

Energy intensity of GDP (primary energy divided by GDP) reduces by 53% between 2005 and 2050 in the Reference scenario; the CPI scenario scores significantly better by improving energy intensity 57%. Energy intensity diminishes further in all decarbonisation scenarios: by at least 67% in the delayed CCS scenario. It improves 70% in the high RES and the low nuclear scenarios and even 71% in the energy efficiency scenario. Under decarbonisation, a unit of GDP in 2050 requires only one third of the energy needed today (or slightly less under e.g. a strong energy efficiency focus). By 2030, energy intensity would improve around 45% from current levels under decarbonisation, while this improvement would amount to some 40% under current policies.

Absolute energy savings, not considering the doubling of GDP between now and 2050, show still impressive numbers. Compared with the recent peak in energy consumption in 2005/6, the energy efficiency scenario depicts 41% less energy consumption, which means a substantial energy saving with respect to the levels reached just before the economic crisis.

Figure 21: Primary energy savings in 2050 compared to 2005




It is important to note that these levels of reduced primary energy demand do not come from reduced GDP or sectoral production levels (which remain the same in all scenarios). Instead they are mainly the result of technological changes on the demand and supply side, coming

from more efficient buildings, appliances, heating systems and vehicles and from electrification in transport and heating. All decarbonisation scenarios over-achieve the 20% energy saving objective in the decade 2020-2030.

The scenarios are based on model assumptions, which are consistent with the input for the 2050 Low Carbon Economy Roadmap. Recognising the magnitude of the decarbonisation challenge, which implies a reversal of a secular trend towards ever increasing energy consumption, this Energy Roadmap has adopted a rather conservative approach as regards the effectiveness of policy instruments in terms of behavioural change. However, the Roadmap results should not be read as implying that the 20% energy efficiency target for 2020 cannot be reached effectively. Greater effects of the Energy Efficiency Plan are possible if the Energy Efficiency Directive is adopted swiftly and completely, followed up by vigorous implementation and marked change in the energy consumption decision making of individuals and companies.⁷

Not only the amount, but also the composition of energy mix would differ significantly in a decarbonised energy system. Figure 22 shows total energy consumption as well as its composition in terms of fuels in 2050 for the various scenarios.

Figure 22: Total Primary Energy in 2050, by fuel



⁷ In modelling terms this means a significant lowering of the discount rate used in energy consumption decision making of hundreds of millions of consumers.

Low and zero carbon content energy sources are strongly encouraged by going the various decarbonisation routes, each of them focusing on different aspects. This has different repercussions on the fuel mix. Energy efficiency encourages primary sources that can be used with small losses (e.g. many renewables or gas) and electricity at the level of final demand. CCS strategies affect the fuel mix by largely neutralising the high carbon content of fossil fuels, notably coal and lignite, through removal of the associated emissions. RES and nuclear routes are directly targeting the fuel mix. The modelling leads to rather wide ranges for primary energy sources with these fuel mixes in the decarbonisation cases all satisfying the decarbonisation requirement by 2050. Moreover, the development of all the fuel mixes under decarbonisation give rise to the same cumulative GHG emissions from 2011 to 2050.


Table 22: Share of fuels in primary energy consumption in %

	Reference scenario	Current Policy Initiatives		Decarbonisation scenarios	
		2005	2030	2050	2030
Solids	17.5	12.4	11.4	12.0	9.4
Oil	37.1	32.8	31.8	34.1	32.0
Gas	24.4	22.2	20.4	22.7	21.9
Nuclear	14.1	14.3	16.7	12.1	13.5
Renewables	6.8	18.4	19.9	19.3	23.3
					21.9-25.6
					40.8-59.6

Renewables increase their share significantly under adopted policies and would substantially rise in all decarbonisation scenarios to reach at least 22% of primary energy consumption by 2030 and 41% by 2050. The RES share is comparably low in those scenarios, in which nuclear plays a rather strong role (scenarios 4 and 5). The RES share is highest in High RES scenario reaching 60% in primary energy by 2050. It is also pretty high (44% and 46% in primary energy in 2050) in the Energy Efficiency and Low nuclear scenarios, respectively.

The RES share is higher when calculated in gross final energy consumption (indicator used for the 20% RES target). It represents at least 28% (2030) and 55% (2050) in all decarbonisation scenarios and rises up to 75% in 2050 in the High RES scenario.

Figure 23: Range of Fuel Shares in Primary Energy in 2050 compared with 2009 outcome



Nuclear developments have been significantly affected by the policy reaction in Member States after the nuclear accident in Fukushima (abandoning substantial nuclear plans in Italy, revision of nuclear policy in Germany). These reactions and the forthcoming nuclear stress tests have been reflected in the modelling assumptions for the Current Policy Initiatives scenario (1bis). The downward effects for nuclear penetration in CPI are also present in the decarbonisation scenarios, since the modelling of these cases also included the recent policy adjustments on nuclear.

The share of nuclear varies depending on assumptions taken. In the scenario without new nuclear investment (except for plants under construction) and extension of lifetime only in this and the next decade, the nuclear share declines gradually to 3% by 2050. In the most ambitious nuclear scenario - Delayed CCS, the share rises to 18%⁸.

The share of gas under Current Policy Initiatives is higher than in the Reference scenario reflecting abandon of the nuclear programme in Italy, no new nuclear power plants in Belgium and higher costs for new plants and retrofitting. The gas share increases slightly to 26% in 2050 in the Low nuclear scenario where the CCS share in power generation is around 32%.

⁸ This share is considerably lower than in decarbonisation scenarios of DG CLIMA. There are three main explanations:

1. Decarbonisation scenarios and Current Policy Initiatives scenario are based on revised assumptions on nuclear (abandon of nuclear programme in Italy, no new nuclear plants in Belgium and upwards revision of costs for nuclear power plants).
2. Electricity demand is lower than in the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap Scenarios due to stringent energy efficiency measures.
3. Revised assumptions on the potential of electricity in transport compared to the DG CLIMA decarbonisation scenarios, following more closely the scenarios developed in the White Paper on Transport leading to lower utilisation rate of nuclear power plants than in the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap Scenarios. Electric vehicles flatten electricity demand and thus incentivise base load power generation.

The oil share declines only slightly until 2030 (and even 2040) due to high dependency of transport on oil based fuels. However, the decline is significant in the last decade 2040-2050 where oil in transport is replaced by biofuels and electric vehicles. The oil share drops to around 15% in 2050 when following any of the examined main directions towards decarbonisation.

The share of solid fuels continues its long standing downward trend already under Reference and CPI developments. Under substantial decarbonisation the solids share shrinks further to reach levels as low as 2% in the High RES scenario in 2050 and only 4% and 5% under Energy efficiency and Delayed CCS, respectively. The solids share would remain rather high only in the Low nuclear scenario (10% in 2050) with a high CCS contribution which allows a continued use of solids in a decarbonisation context.

Final energy demand declines similarly to primary energy demand. Current Policy Scenario shows around 5% decrease (in 2020-2050) compared to the Reference scenario. In the Energy Efficiency scenario the reduction on Reference in final energy demand is -14% in 2030 and -40% in 2050. The decrease in the decarbonisation scenarios is at least -8% in 2030 and -34% in 2050. Compared with actual 2005 outcome, final energy consumption decreases in 2050 by 37% in the High Energy Efficiency scenario and by around 32% in all the other decarbonisation scenarios.

Sectors showing higher reductions than the average are residential, tertiary and generally also transport.

Table 23: Final energy demand, changes compared to the Reference scenario

	Reference scenario			Current Policy Initiatives			Energy efficiency			Diversified supply technologies		
	202	203	205	202	203	205	202	203	205	202	203	205
Final Energy Demand (Mtoe)	122	118	122	7	7	1	-6%	-4%	-5%	-9%	14	40
Industry	330	333	369	-4%	-5%	-5%	-4%	-5%	30%	-7%	-9%	34
Residential	318	299	288	-9%	-6%	-4%	-	-	-	-9%	12%	35%
Tertiary	181	174	181	-8%	-5%	-7%	13%	25%	53%	-8%	15%	42%
Transport	398	382	383	-4%	-2%	-6%	-7%	12%	40%	-7%	-9%	38%
	High RES			Delayed CCS			Low nuclear					
	202	203	205	202	203	205	202	203	205	0	0	0
Final Energy Demand (Mtoe)	-			34			10			10		
Industry	-7%	-8%	%	-7%	%	%	-6%	%	%			
Residential	-4%	-4%	25%	-4%	-5%	26%	-3%	-6%	26%			
Tertiary	-9%	-9%	34%	-9%	12%	35%	-9%	13%	36%			
	-8%	-13%	44%	-8%	16%	42%	-7%	17%	43%			

Transport	-7%	-8%	38%	-	-7%	-9%	39%	-	-7%	-9%	39%	-
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There is a lot of structural change in the fuel composition of final energy demand. Given its high efficiency and emission free nature at use, electricity makes major inroads already under current policies (increase by 9 pp between 2005 and 2050 in CPI).

The electricity share soars further in decarbonisation scenarios reaching 36% - 39% in 2050, reflecting also its important role in decarbonising further final demand sectors such as heating and services and in particular transport. The electricity share would almost double by 2050. The crucial issue for any decarbonisation strategy is therefore the full decarbonisation of power generation (see below).

Table 24: Final energy consumption by fuel in various scenarios

	2005	Reference/CPI		Decarbonisation scenarios	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Electricity	20,2%	24,5% - 25,1%	29,1% - 29,4%	25,2% - 26,0%	36,1% - 38,7%
RES (direct)	4,9%	9,1% - 9,2%	9,0% - 9,4%	8,5% - 10,5%	23,8% - 30,0%
Oil	42,2%	36,1% - 36,8%	35,0% - 35,5%	33,2% - 34,6%	14,9% - 15,6%
Gas	24,2%	18,7% - 19,1%	16,1% - 16,6%	19,4% - 20,0%	11,9% - 12,7%
Heat	3,8%	7,3% - 7,5%	8,2% - 8,6%	7,1% - 8,0%	6,7% - 10,0%
Solid fuels	4,6%	3,2% - 3,3%	2,9% - 3,1%	2,5% - 3,0%	0,3% - 0,4%

Also RES make major inroads under current policies including the 2009 RES Directive. The direct use of RES in final demand (i.e. not counting here the RES input to power and distributed heat generation) rises strongly to 2030 coming close to a doubling of the share. However, without additional policy push beyond the current RES/climate change measures, this RES share could be stagnant. On the contrary, in decarbonisation scenarios the share of directly used RES (e.g. biomass, solar thermal) would go up to 24% in 2050 in almost all decarbonisation cases, except for the high RES scenario, where this share reaches even 30%.

Oil has been dominating final energy for many years and might continue doing so until 2030 even in the decarbonisation scenarios, when it would still account for one third of energy deliveries to final consumers. The big changes come after 2030 when more and more parts of final energy consumption based on oil, especially in transport, are replaced by electricity (e.g. electric and plug in hybrid vehicles, heat pumps). The oil share in 2050 would drop to around 15%.


The gas share has been declining in recent years and would be lower than today under both current policies and decarbonisation in 2030, when gas would account for not more than a fifth in final demand. The gas share after 2030 would be decreasing further in particular in decarbonisation scenarios, which is due to the greater role of electricity in both heating and for providing energy in productive sectors.

Distributed heat would deliver 7-8% of final energy demand in 2030 under both current policies and decarbonisation, raising its share substantially from current levels. The heat share

in 2050 would be highest (10%) in the Low nuclear scenario where high electricity production is ensured by CCS equipped generation from gas and solids, often in a CHP mode.

Solid fuels become rather obsolete in final energy demand under current policies (falling to around 3% in 2030-2050). The decline of the solids share reflects higher use of electricity and gas in heating and industry. Solid fuels become marginal under decarbonisation, especially by 2050, when most solids base processes have been replaced by electricity or other fuels. The solid fuel share in 2050 would shrink to 0.3-0.4%.

Figure 24: Shares of Electricity in Current Trend and Decarbonisation Scenarios



2.3 Power generation

Electricity demand increases in all scenarios compared to 2005 levels, following greater penetration of electricity using appliances, heating and propulsion systems. The increased use of electric devices is partly compensated by the increased energy efficiency of electric appliances as well as increased thermal integrity in the residential and service sectors and more rational use of energy in all sectors, but overall the effect from emerging new electricity uses at large scale for heating and transport is decisive. The development of electricity consumption varies between sectors.

Transport electricity demand increases strongest. The increase of electricity use in transport is due to the electrification of road transport, in particular private cars, which can either be plug-in hybrid or pure electric vehicle; almost 80% of private passenger transport activity is carried out with these kinds of vehicles by 2050. Despite substantial progress regarding energy efficiency of appliances and for efficient heating systems, such as heat pumps, household electricity demand in 2050 under decarbonisation exceeds the current level given the additional deployment of electricity in heating and cooling.

Electricity demand in the other sectors decreases or remains flat under decarbonisation. Electricity demand in services/agriculture diminishes in all decarbonisation scenarios as a result of strong energy efficiency policies, although there is a substitution from other energy

carriers to more efficient electric devices e.g. heat pumps. . Industrial electricity demand remains broadly at the current level by 2050 under decarbonisation.

Table 25: Electricity final energy demand

	2005	2050		
		Reference	Scenario 1bis	Scenario 2
<u>Final energy demand (in TWh)</u>	2762	4130	3951	3203
Industry	1134	1504	1426	1109
Households	795	1343	1230	913
Tertiary	759	1184	1041	518
Transport	74	100	255	663
		2050		
		Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5
<u>Final energy demand (in TWh)</u>	3618	3377	3585	3552
Industry	1211	1169	1201	1191
Households	1026	938	1019	1013
Tertiary	707	605	696	677
Transport	675	664	669	671

Power generation: level and structure by fuel

Given the assumed limited electricity import possibilities from third countries, the increased electricity demand will have to be generated nearly exclusively within the EU. Moreover, electricity production has to cover also power plant own consumption (e.g. for desulphurisation), the consumption of the other energy producing sectors (energy branch) as well as transmission and distribution losses. Furthermore, additional electricity generation is appropriate under strong decarbonisation objectives to produce hydrogen mixed in low and medium pressure gas networks (bringing down emission factors in final demand) and for producing hydrogen, which is used for balancing in the case of high RES scenarios. Therefore, similar to electricity demand there is a strong increase from current levels for power generation in all scenarios. Under decarbonisation, power generation will be lower in 2050 compared with Reference and CPI scenarios. The highest electricity generation level in 2050 among the decarbonisation cases comes about in case of CO₂ reduction focussing particularly strongly on RES.

The structure of power generation changes substantially between the scenarios. The Reference scenario and the Current Policy Initiatives scenario show renewable shares in 2050 reaching 40 and 49% respectively and fossil fuels still having a share of 33 and 31% respectively. Among the decarbonisation scenarios, only the Low nuclear scenario has a share of fossil fuels above 30%, as it makes substantial use of CCS. In the other scenarios the fossil fuel share lies below 25% and is particularly low in High RES scenario, where fossil fuels account for under 10% of electricity generation.

Under decarbonisation, power generation in 2050 is based on renewables for at around 60%-65%, except for the high RES case, in which this share is much higher. Wind alone accounts

for about one third of power generation in most decarbonisation scenarios. In the high RES case, the wind share reaches even close to 50% in 2050. The nuclear share falls from the present level in all decarbonisation scenarios. This share is highest in 2050 under delayed CCS, in which case it is around 20%. On the contrary, in the low nuclear scenario, nuclear would account for just 2.5% of power generation.

Table 26: Power generation

	TWh	2005	2050		
			Reference	Scenario 1bis	Scenario 2
Electricity generation		3274	4931	4620	4281
<u>Nuclear energy</u>	Shares (%)	30.5	26.4	20.6	14.2
<u>Renewables</u>		14.3	40.3	48.8	64.2
<i>Hydro</i>		9.4	7.6	8.5	9.2
<i>Wind</i>		2.2	20.1	24.7	33.2
<i>Solar, tidal etc.</i>		0.0	5.1	7.0	10.6
<i>Biomass & waste</i>		2.6	7.3	8.4	10.9
<i>Geothermal heat</i>		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
<u>Fossil fuels</u>		55.2	33.3	30.6	21.6
<i>Coal and lignite</i>		30.0	15.2	11.1	4.8
<i>Petroleum products</i>		4.1	2.2	2.1	0.0
<i>Natural gas</i>		20.3	15.1	16.7	16.7
<i>Coke & blast-furnace gasses</i>		0.9	0.7	0.7	0.0
<i>Other fuels (hydrogen, methanol)</i>		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
		2050			
		Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Electricity generation	TWh	4912	5141	4872	4853
<u>Nuclear energy</u>	Shares (%)	16.1	3.5	19.2	2.5
<u>Renewables</u>		59.1	83.1	60.7	64.8
<i>Hydro</i>		8.0	7.7	8.1	8.1
<i>Wind</i>		31.6	48.7	32.4	35.6
<i>Solar, tidal etc.</i>		9.9	16.4	9.9	10.8
<i>Biomass & waste</i>		9.3	9.6	9.9	9.8
<i>Geothermal heat</i>		0.3	0.6	0.4	0.4
<u>Fossil fuels</u>		24.8	9.6	20.1	32.7
<i>Coal and lignite</i>		8.1	2.1	5.1	13.1
<i>Petroleum products</i>		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
<i>Natural gas</i>		16.6	7.5	14.9	19.5
<i>Coke & blast-furnace gasses</i>		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Other fuels (hydrogen, methanol)</i>		0.0	3.9	0.0	0.0

NB: power generation is presented in the most comprehensive way in this table involving in a sense some "double counting" in the denominator of shares for the high RES scenario: first electricity generation from RES is counted including those parts of RES based generation that, in case supply exceeds demand, are transformed into hydrogen for later use by producing electricity for a second time from these original renewables sources. This specific representation for showing also the magnitude of hydrogen based RES electricity storage (4% in

2050) leads to total electricity generation numbers that are in a sense inflated, which in turn gives rise to lower RES share numbers in this specific representation that counts production from RES once as such and secondly under hydrogen based generation (shown separately) for the part that is not lost in transformations into hydrogen and back from hydrogen to electricity.

Power plant investments by fuel type (e.g. RES, nuclear, fossils with CCS, fossil without CCS)

The installed capacity increases in all scenarios compared to the Reference scenario due to the additional balancing and power reserve capacities needed for the variable RES which increase in all scenarios. The scenario with the least increase is Energy Efficiency scenario which requires the least amount of electricity and therefore also the least amount of installed capacity. All scenarios still have fossil fuel fired power plants as installed capacity, which are used mainly as back-up.

The share of CCS capacity in thermal power plants for the decarbonisation scenarios ranges from 48% in Low nuclear scenario to 12% in High RES scenario. The share in the other scenarios is between 35 and 44%.

Table 27: Installed power capacity

		2005	2050		
			Reference	Scenario 1bis	Scenario 2
Net Installed Power Capacity		715	1454	1502	1473
Nuclear energy		134	161	117	79
Renewables (without biomass/geothermal)		147	681	784	1012
Hydro (pumping excluded)		105	121	122	125
Wind power		41	382	432	548
Wind on-shore		40	262	291	370
Wind off-shore		1	120	140	177
Solar		2	171	224	330
Other renewables (tidal etc.)		0	6	7	9
Thermal power		434	613	601	382
Solids fired		187	131	104	70
Oil fired		62	168	38	15
Gas fired		167	226	366	187
Biomass-waste fired		18	87	92	108
Hydrogen plants		0	0	0	0
Geothermal heat		1	1	1	2
		2050			
		Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5	Scenario 6
Net Installed Power Capacity		1621	2219	1639	1721
Nuclear energy		102	41	127	16
Renewable (without biomass/geothermal)		1081	1749	1093	1193
Hydro (pumping excluded)		126	131	126	127
Wind power		595	984	609	674

<i>Wind on-shore</i>		398	612	408	452
<i>Wind off-shore</i>		197	373	200	222
Solar		351	603	348	381
Other renewables (tidal etc.)		10	30	10	11
<u>Thermal power</u>		439	429	419	513
Solids fired		94	62	73	125
Oil fired		19	19	18	18
Gas fired		218	182	210	255
Biomass-waste fired		106	163	115	112
Hydrogen plants *		0	0	0	0
Geothermal heat		2	4	2	2

		2005	2050			
			Reference	Scenario 1bis	Scenario 2	
Total CCS capacity	GWe	0	101	39	149	
		0	64	33	28	
		0	0	0	0	
		0	37	6	121	
		2050				
		Scenario 3	Scenario 4	Scenario 5	Scenario 6	
Total CCS capacity	GWe	193	53	148	248	
		50	18	30	79	
		0	0	0	0	
		142	34	118	169	

* Hydrogen capacity in the above table refers only to plant technologies dedicated to specific hydrogen use, such as fuel cells. Capacity for generating electricity from hydrogen, serving only the purpose of storing RES based electricity that was previously produced at times when electricity supply exceeded demand, is accounted for under gas fired capacity, given that hydrogen would be burnt in such types of plants, including as a mixture with natural gas.

The high RES scenario is a particularly challenging scenario regarding the restructuring of the energy system involved; RES policy related challenges in this scenario include the following:

- Huge investments in RES power capacity need to be ensured with wind capacity alone reaching over 980 GW in 2050, this is 20% more than today's (2010) total power generation capacity (including nuclear, fossil fuels and all RES); similarly, solar capacity would need to soar to 600 GW, which amounts to almost three quarters of our present total generation capacity; all RES power generation capacity (Renewables + biomass/waste + geothermal in table 27) would need to increase to over 1900 GW, which is more than 8 times the current RES capacity and also more than twice today's total generation capacity.
- It might be a challenge to ensure the raw material needed for RES technologies and there may be upward pressure on e.g. steel prices, which could be a challenge to such a development (not modelled with the energy model); other logistic challenges would

relate to ensuring the maritime equipment to install and maintain the off-shore wind capacity that rises from just close to 5 GW today to over 370 GW in 2050;

- In order to accommodate RES production from remote sites with respect to consumption centres and to take advantage of the cost differences across Member States for cost-effectiveness reasons, the grid needs to be extended substantially and also smartened to deal with variable feed in from many dispersed sources (e.g. solar PV); the scenario analysis identified needs for grid extension beyond 2020 under a decarbonisation agenda and in addition a set of additional DC links (electricity highways) needed to accommodate a very high RES contribution to electricity supply (see attachment 2 to this Annex);
- Another challenge relates to the skilled workforce required, the lack of which can lead to a stalled development unless a major RES related education and training strategy is pursued taking account of ageing EU population over the next decades, which is even shrinking after 2035. Skilled workforce will also be needed for the construction of expanded, smart grids, which will also be necessary for the penetration of other low carbon technologies.
- In addition to economic, logistical, resource security and manpower challenges, there is the acceptance issue for new transmission lines and perhaps also regarding the substantial expansion of (on-shore) RES installations;

It will also be challenging in the other decarbonisation scenarios to ensure the required RES capacity in 2050 and to accommodate it by the grid. The Energy Efficiency scenario poses the least challenge given the lowest electricity demand, but nevertheless, RES power generation capacity would need to soar to 5 times the current level, exceeding today's total electricity generation capacity (nuclear, fossil fuel and RES combined) by more than a third. On the other hand, increased energy efficiency and decentralised RES might require more sophisticated solutions for distribution level.

Other scenarios pose also substantial challenges throughout the transition. For example, higher nuclear deployment in the delayed CCS scenario leads to more requirements for nuclear fuel and more nuclear waste that needs to be safely transported and stored. Electrification of passenger transport involves many changes in car production and infrastructure provision. A smooth transition from a petrol/diesel to an electricity based system for mainly urban transport requires a lot of logistical changes.

Widespread penetration of CCS will require dedicated CO₂ transport grids that need to be financed, constructed and accepted. Acceptance challenges could be particularly pronounced for nuclear and CO₂ storage. As carbon capture, transport and storage require significant quantities of electricity that need to be generated in addition to electricity for final use, there would be higher input demand also for fossil fuels. This effect would be particularly pronounced if global decarbonisation includes an important contribution from CCS for energy consumption and also for abatement of industrial process emissions. This could exert upward pressure on the level of world fossil fuel prices.

All scenarios involve substantial changes in production, transformation, smart transmission/distribution and consumption patters for energy, requiring a skilled workforce against the background of ageing population. Enhancement of the European capacity for innovation, appropriate RTD as well as education and training will be instrumental for a cost-

effective transition to a low carbon economy that fosters competitiveness and security of supply.

Decarbonisation requires also considerable capacity for CCS, except for the high RES scenario. The other scenarios involve around 150 GW – 250 GW CCS capacity in 2050, with the upper end materialising in Low nuclear scenario, which is the case with the greatest use of CCS for power generation (32% share)

In Table 28 the capacity investment per decade for the scenarios can be seen; as can be observed the highest investments take place in RES in all scenarios. As can be seen no new investment is undertaken in nuclear in Low nuclear scenario after 2030; only Delayed CCS sees higher nuclear investment than in the Reference scenario for the last two decades of the projection period. Investment continues in thermal power plants throughout the projection period in all scenarios; it is lowest in High RES and Energy efficiency scenarios. These investment numbers include lifetime extensions of existing plants, refurbishments and replacement investments on existing sites, which is particularly relevant for nuclear. These investment numbers must not be confused with additional new plants of e.g. nuclear.


Table 28: Net Power Capacity Investment in GWe per decade

		2011-2020	2021-2030	2031-2040	2041-2050
Reference	Nuclear energy	15	64	46	62
	Renewable energy	192	169	192	259
	Thermal power fossil fuels	100	78	184	183
	of which: CCS	5	6	48	41
	Thermal power RES	37	17	14	24
Scenario 1 bis	Nuclear energy	12	42	41	49
	Renewable energy	187	169	245	309
	Thermal power fossil fuels	101	72	169	198
	of which: CCS	3	0	19	17
	Thermal power RES	38	17	13	29
Scenario 2	Nuclear energy	11	24	34	22
	Renewable energy	204	222	318	436
	Thermal power fossil fuels	86	23	92	92
	of which: CCS	3	0	56	90
	Thermal power RES	38	19	27	29
Scenario 3	Nuclear energy	12	46	36	35
	Renewable energy	214	250	348	463
	Thermal power fossil fuels	90	37	130	101
	of which: CCS	3	1	91	98
	Thermal power RES	40	20	27	25
Scenario 4	Nuclear energy	12	30	12	0
	Renewable energy	215	396	588	817
	Thermal power fossil fuels	88	35	66	91
	of which: CCS	3	0	19	30
	Thermal power RES	38	22	55	53

	Nuclear energy	12	47	56	39
	Renewable energy	214	256	354	464
	Thermal power fossil fuels	89	36	79	115
	of which: CCS	3	0	35	110
	Thermal power RES	39	20	37	23
Scenario 5	Nuclear energy	11	4	0	0
	Renewable energy	213	281	385	515
	Thermal power fossil fuels	90	50	163	121
	of which: CCS	3	5	121	118
	Thermal power RES	39	25	26	27
Scenario 6	Nuclear energy	11	4	0	0
	Renewable energy	213	281	385	515
	Thermal power fossil fuels	90	50	163	121
	of which: CCS	3	5	121	118
	Thermal power RES	39	25	26	27

Investment in generation capacity entails substantial cumulative investment expenditure in all scenarios over the period 2011-2050. Cumulative investment expenditure for power generation is most pronounced in the high RES scenario amounting to over 3 trillion € in real terms up to 2050. Among the decarbonisation scenarios cumulative investment expenditure for power generation is lowest in the Energy Efficiency scenario given the marked savings in electricity consumption.

Figure 25: Cumulative investment expenditure in 2011-2050 for power generation (in € of 2008)



These investment expenditure results impact on electricity generation costs in the different scenarios (see below)

Impacts on infrastructure

Infrastructure requirements differ in scenarios. Decarbonisation scenarios require more and more sophisticated infrastructures (mainly electricity lines, smart grids and storage) than Reference and CPI scenarios. High RES scenario necessitates additional DC lines mainly to transport wind electricity from the North Sea to the centre of Europe and more storage. The biggest share of costs relate to the upgrade and improvement of distribution networks including smartening of the grid. Investments needed in transmission lines are much lower and new interconnectors represent only a fraction of these transmission costs.

Table 29: Grid investment costs

(Bn Euro'05)	Grid investment costs			
	2011-2020	2021-2030	2031-2050	2011-2050
Reference	292	316	662	1269
CPI	293	291	774	1357
Energy Efficiency	305	352	861	1518
Diversified supply technologies	337	416	959	1712
High RES	336	536	1323	2195
Delayed CCS	336	420	961	1717
Low nuclear	339	425	1029	1793

Euro'05	Transmission Grid investment (bEUR)				
	2011-2020	2021-2030	2031-2040	2041-2050	2011-2050
Reference	47.9	52.2	53.5	52.0	205.7
CPI	47.1	49.6	64.8	66.6	228.2
Energy Efficiency	49.0	63.1	80.3	80.1	272.5
Diversified supply technologies	52.8	70.2	88.0	86.8	297.8
High RES	52.8	95.5	137.8	134.4	420.4
Delayed CCS	52.7	71.0	88.6	87.6	299.9
Low nuclear	52.9	73.8	95.2	94.8	316.6

Euro'05	Distribution Grid investment (bEUR)				
	2011-2020	2021-2030	2031-2040	2041-2050	2011-2050
Reference	243.7	263.5	280.5	276.0	1063.7
CPI	245.0	239.3	317.6	325.9	1127.8
Energy Efficiency	256.3	289.1	408.4	291.8	1245.5
Diversified supply technologies	284.2	345.9	454.3	329.8	1414.1
High RES	283.5	440.0	619.8	431.5	1774.8
Delayed CCS	283.4	349.4	445.1	339.6	1417.5
Low nuclear	286.4	350.8	472.5	366.5	1476.3

Euro'08	Investments in new electricity interconnectors		
	2006-2020	2021-2030	2031-2050
Reference	13.1	0.3	0.0
CPI	21.9	9.7	0.6
High energy efficiency	21.9	9.7	0.6
Diversified supply technologies	21.9	9.7	0.6
High RES	21.9	21.2	50.8
Delayed CCS	21.9	9.7	0.6
Low nuclear	21.9	9.7	0.6

The model assumes that grid investments, that are prerequisites to the decarbonisation scenarios in this analysis, are undertaken and that costs are fully recovered in electricity prices. The reality might differ from this model situation in a sense that current regulatory regime might be more short to medium term cost minimisation oriented and might not provide sufficient incentives for long-term and innovative investments. There might also be less

perfect foresight and lower coordination of investments in generation, transmission and distribution as the model predicts.

Power generation costs

Fixed operational and capital costs for power generation increase over time in all scenarios. The increase in capital costs is more pronounced in decarbonisation scenarios, notably in the High RES case. A substantial RES contribution (high RES scenario) leads to an increase of fixed and capital costs of 155% in 2050 compared with 2005 (81% rise by 2030) due to the additional investment needs in generation, grid, storage and back-up capacities. On the contrary, the increase in variable and fuel costs over time under Reference and CPI developments would be more or less cancelled in the decarbonisation cases. This effect of shifting variable and fuel costs towards capital costs is most pronounced in the High RES scenario. In this decarbonisation case, the substantial RES contribution leads to a decline of variable and fuel costs by 45% below Reference in 2050 and also a decrease by 21% on the 2005 level.

Unit costs of transmission and distribution increase substantially in all decarbonisation scenarios. The High RES case has the greatest increase. Due to the decarbonisation of the power sector in all scenarios in the last two decades of the projection period, the costs related to ETS auction payments decrease substantially.

These effects on cost components allow for a decrease in electricity prices between 2030 and 2050 in all decarbonisation scenarios, except for the High RES scenario. This is in stark contrast to the period up to 2030, in which electricity prices increase due notably to increases in capital cost, grid costs and auctioning payments. The High RES case is an exception from other cases because of the very high investment requirements combined with stronger requirements on the electricity grid extension, which is not fully compensated by savings in fuel and other variable costs.

Therefore the High RES case features the highest electricity prices among the decarbonisation scenarios, as it would not allow for the flattening out of the strong price increase up to 2030 (observed in all scenarios) but continues with major capital intensive changes to the power system.

Table 31: Electricity prices and cost structure⁹

(Euro'08 per MWhe)	Reference		Scenario 1bis		Scenario 2			
	2005	2030	2050	2030	2050	2030	2050	
Fixed and capital costs	39.6	56.7	52.4	57.4	54.6	63.4	61.6	
Variable and fuel costs	32.0	40.6	46.2	41.1	43.5	34.8	31.2	
Tax on fuels and ETS payments	1.0	9.9	5.0	8.6	6.9	5.0	1.3	
Grid and sales costs	22.8	25.9	25.8	26.7	28.7	28.6	29.5	
Average price of electricity (pre-tax)(*)	95.4	133.2	129.4	133.7	133.6	131.7	123.5	
Average price of electricity (After-tax) (*)	109.3	154.8	151.1	156.0	156.9	154.4	146.7	
(Euro'08 per MWhe)	Scenario 3		Scenario 4		Scenario 5		Scenario 6	
	2030	2050	2030	2050	2030	2050	2030	2050
Fixed and capital costs	63.3	61.9	71.7	101.0	63.9	65.3	64.3	65.3
Variable and fuel costs	34.6	31.3	31.9	25.3	34.4	31.8	37.1	34.6
Tax on fuels and ETS payments	9.3	0.9	5.6	3.6	9.5	1.6	12.2	1.4
Grid and sales costs	29.1	29.1	31.5	41.2	29.3	29.9	30.7	31.9
Average price of electricity (pre-tax) (*)	136.4	123.2	140.7	171.0	137.1	128.6	144.3	133.2
Average price of electricity (After-tax) (*)	159.6	146.2	164.4	198.9	160.4	151.9	168.2	157.2

(*): Average price over all consumer types, including final consumers and energy branch

It is important to note that, as explained in the assumptions part, the PRIMES model makes sure that the full costs of electricity production and distribution are recovered through electricity prices. Both marginal costs and the appropriate portion of fixed capital and operation costs are allocated to the various sectors according to the Ramsey Boiteux methodology taking into account price elasticities in the allocation of fixed costs. This procedure is necessary to ensure a sustainable modelling solution because in internally consistent scenarios electricity sector investments need to be financed by the revenues from selling electricity.

However, power exchanges in wholesale markets work on the basis of marginal costs for determining spot prices with suppliers having lower marginal costs than the equilibrium price being able to cover (parts of) fixed costs. In a situation with a very high contribution of capital intensive low carbon technologies with marginal costs close to zero, such as RES, all suppliers succeeding to place bids might be bidders with such RES power plants and competition at power exchanges would drive this electricity price down close to zero. Obviously, close to zero prices over very long time segments every year would not be a sustainable solution in such a scenario, as the necessary capital expenditure and investment under such market structure could not be financed from selling revenues and such a scenario would not materialise. While PRIMES, presenting functioning scenarios, presents economically sustainable electricity prices, this issue appears to be an institutional challenge for the transition to a low carbon electricity system, especially for one that is nearly entirely based on RES.

⁹ Average electricity prices in this table relate to a somewhat different customer base compared with electricity prices shown in Part A by including also energy branch customers in addition to those in final demand sectors; this explains the slight differences in average prices (e.g. for 2005 between 109.3 €MWh when including the energy branch and 110.1 €MWh when excluding it).

2.4 Other sectors

Heating and cooling: distributed heat/steam and RES

Demand for distributed heat in the decarbonisation scenarios rises compared to current level but is 2%-10% lower by 2030 as compared to the Reference scenario, with the greatest decline occurring in the high RES scenario. The decrease is more pronounced towards 2050 with 46% decrease as compared to Reference scenario in the High RES scenario; 26% decrease in the Energy Efficiency scenario and at least -20% decrease in other decarbonisation scenarios. The High RES scenario shows lowest distributed heat demand after 2025 due to the highest penetration of RES in power generation which leads to decrease of CHP¹⁰ and due to the shift towards electricity use for heating reducing especially district heating from fossil fuels.

When comparing results for distributed heat between Reference and decarbonisation scenarios, it is important to note that final energy demand in the decarbonisation scenarios is 34% - 40% lower in 2050 than under reference developments (around 10% lower in 2030).

The biggest decrease as compared to the Reference scenario in 2050 occurs in the residential sector (-63% in High RES scenario and -32-42% in all other decarbonisation scenarios) reflecting stringent energy efficiency policies in buildings. Demand stays at current levels of around 240 TWh until 2015 and then gradually declines to 69 TWh in the High RES scenario and 126 TWh in the Low nuclear by 2050, showing the higher distributed heat demand among the decarbonisation cases.

The decrease in the tertiary sector is important as well with -43% in the Energy Efficiency scenario and at least -31% in all other scenarios. The demand peaks in 2015 at 120 TWh and goes down to 52 TWh in Energy Efficiency scenario and around 60 TWh in other decarbonisation scenarios.

Contrarily to residential and tertiary, industrial demand for heat increases massively from 160 TWh in 2005 to reach 503 TWh in High RES scenario and up to 733 TWh in Low nuclear/High CCS scenario by 2050. Industrial demand is still lower as compared to Reference scenario by at least 17% in all decarbonisation scenarios and by -43% in High RES scenario. However, industry needs steam for some processes that can hardly be substituted by other fuels.

Heat consumption is also rising in the energy branch from 54 TWh in 2005 to 71-77 TWh in 2050, with the Energy Efficiency and delayed CCS scenarios at the lower end of the range and the Low Nuclear scenario at the upper one.

Following the diverging trends in different sectors the shares of sectors in total distributed heat changes significantly up to 2050.

¹⁰ CHP leads to emission reductions compared to conventional systems, but is only decarbonised when fired with biomass. The use of biomass in PRIMES is optimally allocated endogenously and might therefore not be used for CHP.

Table 32: Heat/steam final consumption

	2005	2050			
		Reference scenario		Decarbonisation scenarios	
Industry	161TWh	31%	880 TWh	76%	503 - 733 TWh 81- 80%
Households	240 TWh	46%	186 TWh	16%	69 - 126 TWh 11 - 13%
Tertiary	116 TWh	22%	92 TWh	8%	52 - 64 TWh 8 - 7%
Final demand	517 TWh	100%	1.159 TWh	100%	627 - 923 TWh 100%

With lower final energy demand under decarbonisation, the share of distributed heat in total heating in the residential, services and agriculture sectors rises somewhat from current level of slightly over 11% in most scenarios, except for the High RES scenario. This decrease in the share of distributed heat is compensated by the increased direct use of biomass for heating, which soars from approx. 13.5% in 2010 to approx. 33% in 2050 in the High RES scenario.

Table 33: Share of distributed heat in total heating for residential and tertiary

	2020	2030	2050
CPI	11.6%	12.0%	12.0%
Energy Efficiency	12.0%	12.8%	13.3%
Div. Supply Technology	11.6%	12.4%	13.4%
High RES	11.6%	11.4%	8.5%
Delayed CCS	11.6%	12.4%	12.4%
Low Nuclear	11.6%	12.5%	13.7%

Heat and steam generation

Heat from CHP rises from 473 TWh in 2005 to 1030 TWh by 2025 in the High RES scenario and then declines to 682 TWh by 2050. In other scenarios, including Energy Efficiency, the rise continues until 2035 with the highest CHP generation in the Low nuclear scenario at 1113, exhibiting a slight decline thereafter. CHP heat production in 2050 covers a range from 682 TWh in the high RES scenario to 1019 TWh in the low nuclear case. As in the Reference scenario the growth is driven by support policies resulting from the application of the CHP directive and ETS carbon prices.

CHP share in power generation is the highest in the Low nuclear scenario reaching 22% in 2030. This share in 2030 is the lowest in the High RES scenario at 19%. By 2050, CHP share decline in all scenarios to 18% in Low nuclear and to 11% in High RES scenarios reflecting higher penetration of wind and solar in power generation (no combined production of heat possible) and electrification of heating in combination with energy efficiency policies to reduce demand for heat.

District heating is already declining from its 2000 levels of almost 190 TWh and this decline continues in the Reference scenario as well as in decarbonisation scenarios to 109 TWh in the Reference scenario and 29 -52 TWh in decarbonisation scenarios. The development of district heating is due to its benefits in reducing emissions in the short and medium term but in the

long run, similarly to CHP plants, if district heating boilers do not use biomass, they emit GHG.

RES in heating and cooling

The modelling of energy demand formation by sector includes heating and cooling requirements as well as a detailed coverage of various ways of satisfying these needs including distributed heating and cooling from co-generation and district heating. As can be seen from table 34, there is very significant progress in all decarbonisation cases regarding the share of RES in heating and cooling. The RES share in heating and cooling doubles between 2005 and 2020 in all scenarios, reaching at least 44% by 2050 under decarbonisation. The highest share of well over 50% in 2050 is achieved in the High RES scenario.

Table 34: Percentage share of RES in gross final consumption of heating and cooling

% share	2020	2030	2050
CPI	20.9	22.7	23.8
Energy Efficiency	21.0	23.3	44.9
Div. Supply Technology	20.9	23.8	44.0
High RES	20.9	26.8	53.5
Delayed CCS	20.9	24.2	44.9
Low Nuclear	20.8	24.3	44.6

Transport

In the decarbonisation scenarios, transport energy demand is projected to decline by close to 40% below Reference in 2050 due to active policies for tightening CO₂ standards (essentially impacting on fuel efficiency), taxation, internal market and infrastructure measures¹¹. The highest energy savings, in order of 155 Mtoe, are achieved in the Energy Efficiency scenario but all decarbonisation scenarios deliver savings in the same order of magnitude (around 150 Mtoe). Over 60% of these energy savings originate from passengers transport.

Energy intensity in passenger transport improves by slightly over 60% between 2005 and 2050 in the decarbonisation scenarios, mainly due to the enforcement of such efficiency standards. For freight transport, the efficiency standards together with measures encouraging a shift in modal choices lead to around 40% decrease in the energy intensity.

The EU transport system would remain extremely dependent on the use of fossil fuels in the Reference scenario. Oil products would still represent 88% of the EU transport sector final demand in 2030 and 2050 in the Reference scenario. Consumption of oil would decrease by 11% by 2050, relative to the Reference scenario, in the Current Policy Initiatives scenario mainly driven by the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive.

In the decarbonisation scenarios, final consumption of oil by transport is expected to decrease by almost 70% in 2050, relative to the Reference scenario; the oil share in final demand would amount to around 45%. This decline is compensated to a certain extent by the rise in the electricity demand by road and rail transport and the increased demand for biofuels, especially in aviation, inland navigation and long distance road freight, where electrification

¹¹ The decarbonisation scenarios reflect the transport policy measures included in the White Paper "Roadmap to a Single Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system" (COM (2011) 144) with highest impact on energy demand in transport.

is not or less an option. Biofuels would represent slightly below 40% of energy consumption in aviation and inland navigation and 41% in long distance road freight by 2050. The role of biofuels in energy demand by passenger cars and light duty vehicles would be more limited, ranging between 13% and 15%. Electricity would provide around 65% of energy demand by passenger cars and light duty vehicles in all decarbonisation scenarios. Electro-mobility would need to be supported by the upgrade of Europe's networks towards a European super grid and decarbonisation of electricity sector.

As a result of the higher demand for electricity and sustainable biofuels, the share of renewables in transport would increase by 2050, ranging between 62% and 73%. This difference between the decarbonisation scenarios can be explained by the different power generation mix, despite similar shares of biofuels and electricity demand in energy consumption by transport mean. Therefore, the highest share of renewables in transport is achieved in the High RES scenario.

2.5 Security of supply

Import dependency in 2030 does not change substantially in decarbonisation scenarios as compared to Reference scenario and Current Policy Initiatives scenario due to decline in both gross inland consumption and imports. There is however a substantial decrease in 2050, driven by increased use of domestic resources, mainly renewables. Import dependency is only 35% in High RES scenario (compared to 58% in the Reference scenario and Current Policy Initiatives scenario) and 39-40% in all other decarbonisation scenarios besides Low nuclear scenario (45%) where it is higher due to significant use of fossil fuels with CCS. Decarbonisation will significantly reduce fossil fuel security risks.

Table 35: Import dependency

%	2009	2030	2050
1.Reference	53.9	56.4	57.6
1 bis Current Policy Initiatives		57.5	58.0
2. Energy efficiency		56.1	39.7
3. Diversified supply technologies		55.2	39.7
4. High RES		55.3	35.1
5. Delayed CCS		54.9	38.8
6. Low nuclear		57.5	45.1

Large scale electrification combined with more decentralised power generation from variable sources brings other challenges to high quality energy service at any time. An adequate stability of the grid is a precondition for the consistent modelling of all scenarios; that is why differences in indicators such as reserve margin are rather small.

Utilisation rates of electric capacities decrease from 49% in 2005 to 36% in 2050 in the Reference scenario and to a range of 25% (High RES) to 33% (Diversified supply technologies scenario) in decarbonisation scenarios. This reflects higher requirements for reserve power and balancing services in order to keep supply of electricity reliable and secure in all scenarios.

All scenarios see a high increase in the share of variable RES in the electricity supply; this naturally leads to higher balancing requirements in the system. In the long term the balancing is met to the greatest extent by increased pumped storage (to the extent there is still increased potential available), the development of flexible gas-based units, higher import-exports and in

the case of very high RES penetration with hydrogen based balancing. Thermal power plants, mainly gas fired ones, remain available as reserve power and provide ancillary services. The reduction in utilisation rates of thermal power plants is driven by economic considerations, not by predetermined exogenous inputs.

Utilisation rates for steam stay stable in the Reference scenario at around 43% but decrease to a range of 26% (High RES) and 36% (Diversified supply technologies scenario) in decarbonisation scenarios. Energy savings and electrification in heating which takes place in the decarbonisation scenarios limits the scope for further expansion of distributed heat/steam and CHP, except in cases of production with carbon free (or very low carbon content) resources (e.g. biomass, gas mixed with hydrogen).

Import-export flows of electricity are also driven by economic considerations in the internal market, for which simulations were carried out separately for every scenario. This allows for trade between countries and therefore for optimal use of the interconnections and generation capacities across countries, taking into consideration the limits of the interconnector capacities, which have been adapted according to the challenges posed by the different scenarios. . The simulation thus allows for a better cost optimisation of the power generation system across the EU Member States in the context of stable grid operations at European level at any time.

It emerges clearly from table 36 that decarbonisation would involve greater electricity trade among Member States, which is most pronounced in the case that decarbonisation focuses overwhelmingly on RES.

Table 36: Grid stability related indicators

Power Reserve Margin (%)			Volume of electricity trade (TWh)		
Ratio of dispatchable nominal capacities with RES contributing with (small) capacity credits divided by total peak demand (EU net imports not included)			Sum of all export and import flows of electricity as simulated by the model (lower than in reality)		
	2020	2030	2050	2020	2030
Reference	24,1	16,0	17,7	212,1	217,6
Scenario 1bis	26,8	19,1	22,0	255,8	307,5
Scenario 2	29,1	24,6	27,8	303,1	450,8
Scenario 3	25,7	21,2	23,8	326,6	476,1
Scenario 4	25,6	21,7	32,2	304,4	602,8
Scenario 5	25,7	21,7	25,9	322,8	489,0
Scenario 6	25,1	20,4	26,3	317,8	482,5
Contribution of electricity storage (%)			Volume of electricity trade as % of gross final electricity demand		
Extraction of electricity from storage systems as percentage of gross final demand of electricity			Sum of all export and import flows of electricity as simulated by the model (lower than in reality) as percentage of gross final electricity demand		
	2020	2030	2050	2020	2030
Reference	1,2	1,1	1,3	6,0	5,7
Scenario 1bis	1,1	1,1	1,1	7,4	8,6
Scenario 2	1,1	1,3	1,0	9,0	13,7
Scenario 3	1,1	1,2	1,0	9,4	13,2

Scenario 4	1,1	1,2	6,5	Scenario 4	8,8	17,0	24,3
Scenario 5	1,1	1,2	1,0	Scenario 5	9,3	13,6	14,3
Scenario 6	1,1	1,2	1,1	Scenario 6	9,1	13,7	13,4

Share of decentralised power generation (%)			
Share of generation by small scale power plants which are connected to low voltage and medium voltage grid over total net power generation			
	2020	2030	2050
Reference	6,3	9,1	10,6
Scenario 1bis	6,5	10,0	13,9
Scenario 2	7,1	13,1	21,8
Scenario 3	7,2	13,0	20,9
Scenario 4	7,2	17,3	31,3
Scenario 5	7,2	13,1	21,4
Scenario 6	7,1	14,0	24,3

Investment in electricity grids (bn EUR'08)			
Investment expenditure on electricity networks over the indicated time period			
	2006-2020	2021-2030	2031-2050
Reference	389,9	308,0	649,0
Scenario 1bis	387,3	291,1	773,6
Scenario 2	405,4	352,2	860,5
Scenario 3	436,8	416,1	958,9
Scenario 4	434,4	535,5	1323,5
Scenario 5	436,2	420,4	960,9
Scenario 6	438,9	424,6	1029,0

2.6 Policy related indicators

Emissions and ETS prices

All decarbonisation scenarios achieve 80% GHG reduction and close to 85% energy related CO2 reductions (83.4-84.4%) in 2050 compared to 1990 as well as equal cumulative emissions over the projection period. In 2030, energy-related CO2 emissions are between 38-41% lower, and total GHG emissions reductions are lower by 40-42%. In 2040, energy related CO2 emissions are 63-66% below their 1990 level, while total GHG emission fall by 61-63%.

Power generation would be almost completely decarbonised with CO2 emissions in 2050 plummeting 96-99% compared with 1990. CO2 emission reductions by 2050 are particularly high (minus 86-88%) also in the services/agriculture sector as well as in households (minus 85-87%). Energy related CO2 emissions in industry fall 77-79% below their 1990 level. Transport CO2 emission are 60-62% lower in 2050 compared with 1990.

The ETS price rises moderately from current level until 2030 and significantly in the last two decades providing support to all low carbon technologies and energy efficiency. Concrete policy measures such as those pushing energy efficiency and/or those enabling penetration of renewables depress demand for ETS allowances which subsequently lead to lower carbon prices. Carbon prices are the lowest in the Energy Efficiency scenario where energy demand is the lowest followed by High RES scenario (second lowest in 2030 and 2040) and the Diversified supply technology scenario (second lowest in 2050). Delay in penetration of technologies (CCS) or unavailability of one decarbonisation option (nuclear) put an upwards pressure on demand for allowances and ETS prices.

Table 37: ETS prices in €08/t CO2

	2020	2030	2040	2050
Reference scenario	18	40	52	50
Current Policy Initiatives	15	32	49	51
Energy Efficiency	15	25	87	234
Diversifies supply technologies	25	52	95	265
High RES	25	35	92	285
Delayed CCS	25	55	190	270
Low nuclear	20	63	100	310

The same carbon value as in the ETS applies also to non-ETS sectors after 2020 assuring cost-efficient emissions abatement in the whole economy.

CCS storage needs

Making use of the CCS option will require considerable storage capacities for CO2 over time. The Reference scenario developments, including a more optimistic picture on CCS demonstration and availability of storage sites, would require storage capacity for the cumulative CO2 emissions captured up to 2050 of 8 billion tonnes of CO2.

In the CPI scenario, CCS penetration is more moderate leading to storage requirements of 3 bn t CO2 up to 2050. The lowest storage needs come about under high RES scenario, in which case the additional storage requirements over CPI amount to 0.5 bn t CO2. The highest storage needs comes in the Low nuclear scenario leading to considerable CCS penetration, which requires almost 13 bn t CO2 storage capacity up to 2050. Also the Diversified Supply Technology scenario would require considerable storage capacity.

Table 38: CCS storage needs for power generation and industrial processes up to 2050 (in bn t CO2)

	power generation	process related CO2	total CO2
Reference	7,95	0,00	7,95
CPI	3,00	0,00	3,00
Energy Efficiency	4,08	1,52	5,59
Div. Supply Techn.	6,80	2,18	8,98
RES	1,77	1,72	3,50
delayed CCS	4,06	0,62	4,68
low nuclear	10,45	2,35	12,80

RES targets and biomass

The Reference scenario assumes that the RES target is reached in 2020. The RES share (as % of gross final energy consumption according to the definition of the RES directive) is slightly higher in all decarbonisation scenario in 2020 (21%), rises to at least 28% in 2030 and 55% in 2050. In the High RES scenario this share is at 31% in 2030 and 75% in 2050.

The share of renewables in power generation is even higher and stands at 86% in 2050 in the High RES scenario. The share in consumption is even higher, since with much more variable supply and demand some electricity produced needs to be stored and losses linked to such storage processes lead to lower consumption compared to production, i.e. reducing significantly the denominator of such a share. When calculating the RES-E share in line with the calculation of the overall RES share in gross final energy consumption, i.e. excluding energy losses linked to pump storage and hydrogen storage of electricity, the RES share in electricity consumption amounts to 97% in 2050 in the High RES case.

The share of renewables in transport (target of 10% for 2020 in the RES directive) is 1 percentage point higher in all decarbonisation scenarios in 2020; it rises to 19%-20% in 2030 and to 62%-73% in 2050. The share of renewables in transport in the High RES scenario is 20% in 2030 and even 73% in 2050. The increase between 2030 and 2050 as well as the difference to the Reference scenario and Current Policy Initiatives scenario of almost 50 percentage points in 2050 for the decarbonisation scenarios is remarkable and shows the importance of RES based decarbonisation of transport, either directly via biofuels or indirectly via RES based electricity. Decarbonisation efforts and RES share in transport are rather moderate till 2030 but rise significantly from 2030 to 2050.

The large share of RES in the scenarios is driven by a strong support for RES in the form of an implicit facilitation of RES in the scenarios. These lead to shifts in RES potential curves in the decarbonisation scenarios, allowing for more RES exploitation at a given deployment cost level, compared to the Reference scenario. This includes facilitation policies such as:

- For biomass: agricultural policies stimulating the production of energy crops, increased residue collection, and/or increased yield of crops;
- For wind: regarding on-shore it comprises the availability of more land area and a facilitation of the licensing requirements; for off-shore it also represents a facilitation of licensing and the development of technologies that allow placing off-shore power plants in deeper areas or further offshore; and
- For small scale solar PV and wind: development of smart grids and other facilitation policies.

The total use of biomass in the various scenarios is shown in table 39. Whereas the Reference and CPI scenarios have about 100 Mtoe more biomass use in 2050 compared with today's level, there is around 70-80 Mtoe additional biomass use in most decarbonisation scenarios in 2050, except for the high RES case, in which the additional biomass use amounts to around 120 Mtoe.

Table 39: Use of biomass and biofuels

ktoe	2005	Reference scenario		Current policy Initiatives	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Total domestic biomass <i>of which biofuels</i>	86285 3129	179649 35255	185863 36957	175987 34295	188914 38912
Biofuels in bunkers	0	0	0	133	2325
Total use of biomass	86285	179649	185863	176120	191239
		Energy efficiency		Diversified supply technologies	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Total domestic biomass <i>of which biofuels</i>	162716 25033	241476 68393	172145 26174	253209 71047	
Biofuels in bunkers		553	18062	553	17995
Total use of biomass	163268	259538	172698	271204	
		High RES		Delayed CCS	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Total domestic biomass <i>of which biofuels</i>	188675 26296	301805 72453	172953 26112	252893 69370	
Biofuels in bunkers		553	18060	552	17523
Total use of biomass	189227	319865	173505	270415	
		Low nuclear			
		2030	2050		
Total domestic biomass <i>of which biofuels</i>	175360 26135	257226 70794			
Biofuels in bunkers		553	17981		
Total use of biomass	175913	275206			

Biofuel consumption rises by a factor of more than ten between 2005 and 2050 under current policies to reach 37-39 Mtoe in 2050. Decarbonisation of transport requires substantially greater biofuels use, which increases to 68-72 Mtoe in 2050, with the highest levels being reached in the High RES and Diversified Supply Technology scenarios.

2.7 Overall system costs, competitiveness and other socio-economic impacts

This section deals with the costs for providing the energy services to the EU economy and society. One key element of such costs is the external fuel bill, i.e. the amount of money that the EU economy has to pay to the outside world for procuring all the net imports of oil, gas and solid fuels from the rest of the world.

The **external fuel bill** arising from the net imports of fossil fuels decreases below 2005 levels in all decarbonisation scenarios by 2050. This result stems from the pursuit of this major decarbonisation as a part of a global effort with industrial countries as a group reducing GHG emissions by 80%. In such a global setting, fossil fuel import prices will be much lower (see part on assumptions) and actual imports of fossil fuel will be much lower, too. These both effects reduce the expenditure for each of the fossil fuels and thereby the total external fuel bill of the EU. The decrease of the fuel bill in the decarbonisation scenarios is smallest in the

Low Nuclear scenario at 31% and highest in the high RES scenario with 43% with RES replacing most fossil fuels.

Compared with current level, all decarbonisation scenarios increase the external fuel bill in 2030, but to much lower levels than the Reference and Current Policy Initiative scenarios. While the external fuel bill would double between 2005 and 2030 under Reference and Current Policy Initiatives developments, this increase would be limited to around 40% under these decarbonisation policies.

Table 40: External fossil fuel bill (in bn €(08))

	2005	Reference		CPI	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Bn. EUR'08	269.1	549.2	752.2	531.9	704.2
Diff. to 2005		104%	180%	98%	162%
		Energy Efficiency		Diversified supply technologies	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Bn. EUR'08		364.5	165.7	379.0	180.1
Diff. to 2005		35%	-38%	41%	-33%
		High RES		Delayed CCS	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Bn. EUR'08		374.8	154.2	377.0	180.4
Diff. to 2005		39%	-43%	40%	-33%
		Low nuclear			
		2030	2050		
Bn. EUR'08		382.0	186.4		
Diff. to 2005		42%	-31%		

Savings in the external fuel bill are most striking in 2050. Compared with Current Policy Initiatives, the EU economy could save in 2050 between 518 and 550 bn €(08) by going this strong decarbonisation route under global climate action. The largest energy bill savings come about in the high RES scenario. Such fuel bill savings have strong impacts on overall energy system costs.

Total costs for the entire energy system include capital costs (for energy installations such as power plants and energy infrastructure, energy using equipment, appliances and vehicles), fuel and electricity costs and direct efficiency investment costs (house insulation, control systems, energy management, etc), the latter being also expenditures of capital nature. Capital costs are expressed in annuity payments. Total costs exclude disutility and auction payments.

Auction payments are expenditures for individual actors/sectors that are not costs for the economy as a whole, since the auctioning revenues are recycled back to the economy. Disutility costs are a concept that captures losses in utility from adaptations of individuals to policy impulses or other influences through changing behaviour and energy consumption patterns that might bring them on a lower level in their utility function. Such disutility costs correspond to a monetary estimation (income compensating variation) of lower utility from useful energy services (lighting, heating, mobility, etc.) resulting from a more rational use behaviour by consumers who for example adjusts thermostats, switch lighting off or travel less in order to adapt to higher costs of useful energy services. Such costs monetisation captures relevant issues regarding new consumption patterns especially for a short to medium time horizon, but becomes more challenging and uncertain in the long term, given that monetisation requires the comparison with a counterfactual development assuming unchanged tastes, habits and values over up to 40 years.¹²

¹² The PRIMES model having a micro-economic foundation, deals with utility maximisation and can calculate such perceived utility losses via the concept of compensating variations. However, this

Table 41: Energy system costs

Average annual energy system costs 2011-2050

Bn. EUR'08	Ref	CPI	High Energy effic.	Div. supply techn.	High RES	Delayed CCS	Low nuclear
Capital cost	955	995	1115	1100	1089	1094	1104
Energy purchases	1622	1611	1220	1295	1355	1297	1311
Direct efficiency inv. costs *	28	36	295	160	164	161	161
Total system cost excl. all auction payments and disutility **	2582	2619	2615	2535	2590	2525	2552

Absolute Difference to Reference

Bn. EUR'08	High Energy effic.	Div. supply techn.	High RES	Delayed CCS	Low nuclear
Δ Capital cost	160	145	134	139	149
Δ Energy purchases	-402	-327	-267	-325	-312
Δ Direct efficiency inv. costs *	267	132	135	133	133
Δ Total system cost excl. all auction payments and disutility **	33	-47	8	-57	-29

Absolute Difference to CPI

Bn. EUR'08	High Energy effic.	Div. supply techn.	High RES	Delayed CCS	Low nuclear
Δ Capital cost	120	105	94	99	109
Δ Energy purchases	-391	-316	-256	-314	-300
Δ Direct efficiency inv. costs *	260	125	128	126	125
Δ Total system cost excl. all auction payments and disutility **	-4	-84	-29	-94	-67

Percentage change to Reference

%	High Energy effic.	Div. supply techn.	High RES	Delayed CCS	Low nuclear
Capital cost	16,8	15,2	14,0	14,6	15,6
Energy purchases	-24,8	-20,2	-16,5	-20,0	-19,2
Direct efficiency inv. costs *	937,3	462,4	475,0	466,9	465,5
Total system cost excl. all auction payments and disutility **	1,3	-1,8	0,3	-2,2	-1,1

Percentage change to CPI

%	High Energy effic.	Div. supply techn.	High RES	Delayed CCS	Low nuclear

concept has to assume that preferences and values remain the same, even over 40 years, and has to compare utility with a hypothetical state of no policy or no change in framework conditions. Examples of such decreases are lowering thermostat in space heating, reducing cooling services in offices, switching light off, staying home instead of travelling, using a bicycle instead of a car, etc.

Capital cost	12,0	10,5	9,5	10,0	10,9
Energy purchases	-24,3	-19,6	-15,9	-19,5	-18,6
Direct efficiency inv. costs *	729,5	349,8	359,9	353,4	352,2
Total system cost excl. all auction payments and disutility **	-0,1	-3,2	-1,1	-3,6	-2,5

* Include costs for insulation, double/triple glazing and for efficiency enhancing changes in production processes not accounted for under energy capital and fuel/electricity purchase costs;

** These macroeconomic costs do not include ETS auctioning payments that represent a cost from the individual economic actors point of view, but do not present a cost to society given that auctioning revenues are recycled back to the economy (societal perspective); auctioning payments are partly included in energy purchase costs (e.g. in electricity prices) and partly paid directly by actors subject to ETS; total costs in table 41 differ from the sum of the items shown; table 42 on additional information below gives more detail

Table 42: Additional information on auctioning payments, disutility and total costs from the individual economic actor's point of view (bn €(08) per year on average in 2011-2050)

Bn. EUR'08	Ref	CPI	High Energy effic.	Div. supply techn.	High RES	Delayed CCS	Low nuclear
Auctioning payments	30	28	20	27	24	36	30
Total energy system cost (a)	2612	2647	2635	2562	2614	2561	2583
Disutility costs (b)	92	112	153	174	181	211	190
Total energy system costs including auction payments and disutility (c)	2704	2759	2788	2735	2795	2773	2772

- (a) From the individual economic actors' point of view, including direct and indirect (via purchase of e.g. electricity) auctioning costs, but excluding disutility costs;
- (b) Disutility costs are costs stemming from behavioural change, such as changing lighting quality, lowering thermostat temperature, replacing fuel consuming mobility with other types of mobility (e.g. bikes) or telecommunication that are not accounted for by expenditure flows in the model, but change the level of utility of consumers; such changes are linked to carbon values in non-ETS (which do not represent a cost in cash terms), but are a proxy for policy measures bringing about such behavioural change; direct costs of such change in terms of investment and fuel bills are accounted for in the normal modelling procedure; given the long time horizon and possibly changing preference, the estimation of disutility costs is surrounded with uncertainty.
- (c) From the individual economic actors' point of view, including direct and indirect (via purchase of e.g. electricity) auctioning costs as well as disutility costs;

NB: The lower system cost (without auctioning revenue and disutility) in the Delayed CCS scenario compared with the Diversified supply technologies scenario (that is unrestricted regarding technology) is not present when auctioning revenues and disutility costs are included, i.e. the point of view of the economic actors is taken (numbers denoted with (c) above). In this case, the Diversified Supply Technology scenario has the lowest costs. The modelling approach simulates the system from the point of view of economic actors, who perceive auctioning payments and disutility as cost to them that they want to minimise. Disutility costs are however surrounded with uncertainty given the long time horizon and their dependence on preferences and values. Moreover they represent a monetary equivalent in terms of imputed income compensation of changes in utility and are not associated with payments represented in the process of modelling (e.g. energy purchases, investment sums). Given the uncertain and somewhat controversial nature of disutility costs for a 40 year time horizon this long term assessment of economic impacts reports on costs without disutility. Furthermore, taking a macro-economic perspective auctioning revenues can be seen as transfers as they are supposed to be recycled, justifying their exclusion from the macro-economic cost evaluation.

The average additional energy system cost per year from 2011 to 2050 compared with the Reference and Current Policy Initiatives scenario are rather small due to the pursuit of this

major decarbonisation as a part of a global effort. Given that the Current Policy Initiatives scenario is the most up to date current trend scenario and that all decarbonisation scenarios base themselves on this updated baseline, the following comparison starts from the CPI scenario (1bis).

The Delayed CCS scenarios and the Diversified Supply Technologies have the lowest level of average annual energy system costs, representing even a cost saving compared with CPI (of 94 bn €(08) and 84 bn €(08), respectively) given the large fossil fuel import cost savings discussed above. These are scenarios, in which there is a rather high nuclear penetration in addition to substantial RES penetration and strong energy efficiency progress. Given these fossil fuel import bill effects, also the Low Nuclear Scenario would produce average annual fuel bill savings of 67 bn €(08) when compared with CPI. The High RES scenario gives rise to a annual energy system cost saving of 29 bn €(08) when compared with CPI, while the annual cost savings for the Energy Efficiency scenario amount to 4 bn €(08).

The cost savings in the Energy Efficiency scenario are smaller (4 bn €) given that very high energy efficiency progress requires strong action on the building stock entailing major expenditure for accelerated building renovation, in addition to costs for other energy efficient equipment including the costly transition to electric and plug in hybrid vehicles. High renovation rates are one of the salient features of the energy efficiency scenario. Electromobility also provides for greater energy efficiency in the system. However, this higher cost does not disqualify energy efficiency policies as such, as strong energy efficiency policies leading to substantial improvements and energy savings, are present in all scenarios. The Energy efficiency scenario just shows that there are certain limits from where on other decarbonisation routes are less costly than further reductions of energy consumption.

All scenarios show higher annual costs in the last two decades 2031-2050 reflecting mainly increased investments in transport equipment as the major transition to electric and plug in hybrids vehicles is projected after 2030. In High RES scenario costs are also linked to significant expansion of RES based power generation capacity.

Cumulative auction payments are lowest in Energy efficiency scenario due to the reduced energy consumption, decreasing emissions and therefore the necessity to buy ETS permits. The scenario with the highest auction revenues is Delayed CCS where the delay in the use of CCS leads to high carbon prices in the long-term to ensure the achievement of the decarbonisation target via the uptake of this technology in these later years. The PRIMES model works with perfect foresight in the supply side module, therefore the high carbon prices are expected, influencing choices already in previous years. The auction revenues represent an equivalent of around 1% of total cumulative energy system costs.

When relating the cumulative costs to the GDP (which remains constant in these scenarios) the **ratio of costs to GDP** is similar across the scenarios (around 14.1% to 14.6%) exhibiting costs at the low end of the range in case of diversified supply technologies and delayed CCS.

Table 43: Energy system costs (without auction payments and disutility) related to GDP

	Cumulative costs as percentage of GDP (*)
Reference	14.37%
CPI	14.58%

Energy Efficiency	14.56%
Diversified Supply Technology	14.11%
High RES	14.42%
Delayed CCS	14.06%
Low Nuclear	14.21%

Change in cost structure: fixed costs versus variable costs

The composition of energy costs changes over time and varies across scenarios. The share of fixed cost (capital costs including for e.g. insulation) rises in all scenarios. Following larger capital expenditure for e.g. power generation, grids, energy efficiency investment over time energy, the progress in energy efficiency, greater use of technologies with low operating costs (most RES) and lower world fossil fuel prices in the decarbonisation scenarios bring lower fuel and emission allowances costs. Consequently, the share of capital costs increases over time, especially in the Energy Efficiency and High RES scenarios, which have the highest fixed cost shares (see table 44).

Table 44: Share of fixed costs* in total energy costs (averages over the time periods indicated)**

	2011-2030	2031-2050	2011-2050
Reference	44%	53%	49%
Current Policy Initiatives	45%	54%	50%
Energy Efficiency	52%	74%	65%
Diversified Supply Technologies	50%	70%	62%
High RES	50%	71%	63%
Delayed CCS	50%	70%	62%
Low Nuclear	50%	70%	62%

* capital costs for equipment, appliances, and energy efficiency investment (e.g. insulation), more efficient and cleaner vehicles

** total energy cost from the economic actors' point of view: including auctioning costs

Energy related costs for companies

Energy related costs in relation to sectoral value added rise from 5.8% in 2005 to 7.8% in 2030 in the Reference/CPI cases and to around 7.5% in the decarbonisation scenarios. In 2050, under current policies, this indicator declines to 7.5% and even more so in the decarbonisation scenarios falling to under 7%. Long term energy costs relative to value added of companies under decarbonisation are lower in the decarbonisation cases than under current policies thanks to substantial global decarbonisation efforts. Whereas relative costs for stationary use (heating, process energy, appliances, lighting, etc) in the decarbonisation scenarios remain at the current level by 2030, there is a strong increase in costs related to value added for transport services. After 2030, both stationary and transport energy costs decline somewhat when related to value added. Overall, energy costs relative to value added in 2050 are only somewhat higher than they were in 2005 under decarbonisation, whereas there would be a much more pronounced increase of such costs in the absence of such decarbonisation under significant global climate action.

Table 15: Energy related costs of companies

%	2005	Reference		Scenario 1 bis	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Ratio of energy related costs to value added	5.8	7.8	7.5	7.8	7.5
<i>of which stationary uses</i>	4.3	4.8	4.5	4.6	4.3
<i>of which transportation uses</i>	1.5	3.0	2.9	3.1	3.1
		Scenario 2		Scenario 3	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Ratio of energy related costs to value added		7.6	6.6	7.4	6.4
<i>of which stationary uses</i>		4.4	3.9	4.2	3.8
<i>of which transportation uses</i>		3.2	2.7	3.1	2.6
		Scenario 4		Scenario 5	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Ratio of energy related costs to value added		7.3	6.9	7.4	6.3
<i>of which stationary uses</i>		4.3	4.1	4.2	3.8
<i>of which transportation uses</i>		3.0	2.7	3.2	2.5
		Scenario 6			
		2030	2050		
Ratio of energy related costs to value added		7.5	6.5		
<i>of which stationary uses</i>		4.3	3.8		
<i>of which transportation uses</i>		3.2	2.7		

Energy intensive industries face particularly high energy costs for their highly energy consuming production processes. Five industrial sectors (iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, non metallic mineral products, chemicals, paper and pulp industries) have such high energy costs and are therefore particularly concerned by potential changes from decarbonisation in the energy component of their costs. Table 46 shows for these energy intensive industries combined the ratio of energy related costs for production processes and other stationary use, on the one hand, and their value added, on the other.

Table46: Ratio of energy related costs to value added for energy intensive industries

	2005	2030	2050
Reference	33.7%	40.8%	40.5%
CPI		39.4%	39.5%
Energy Efficiency		35.6%	30.6%
Diversified Supply Technologies		36.4%	32.4%
High RES		36.1%	34.8%
Delayed CCS		36.5%	33.2%
Low Nuclear		37.1%	33.5%

Energy costs of energy intensive industries relative to value added would increase under Reference and CPI developments. This development stems also from rising world fossil fuel prices under current trends. It is worth noting that under global climate action bringing with it lower energy import prices and due to substantial energy efficiency progress, the ratio of energy costs to value added in energy intensive industries would decline in all decarbonisation scenarios – most markedly in the Energy Efficiency scenario

Effects of fragmented climate action: competitiveness and energy consequences of safeguards for energy intensive industries

This Energy Roadmap has assumed the implementation of the European Council's decarbonisation objective that includes similar efforts by industrialised countries as a group. The analysis presented focuses on energy consequences. A more comprehensive analysis of different global paths to decarbonisation was presented in the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap 2050¹³ exploring impacts of three global climate situations: a) business as usual; b) global climate action and c) fragmented action. Fragmented action assumes strong EU climate action that is however followed globally only by the low end of Copenhagen pledges up to 2020 and afterwards the ambition level of the pledges is assumed to stay constant. It analyses impacts on energy intensive industries (EII) both in a global macroeconomic modelling framework to address carbon leakage issues and by means of energy system modelling to address effects of fragmented action, including electricity costs for companies. Electricity costs are, in fact, higher in the fragmented action scenarios as compared to global action scenarios due to higher energy import prices. On the other hand, carbon prices are lower under fragmented action.

A "fragmented" action scenario including measures against carbon leakage was not analysed in this IA report as the challenges for the energy sector arising from decarbonisation are the biggest under "global climate action" assumption, given that fragmented action with measures against carbon leakage will deliver lower GHG reductions by 2050. Decarbonisation scenarios that accommodate action against carbon leakage under fragmented action would either go for lower ambitions in terms of GHG reduction or would have measures included that imply such lower efforts for energy intensive industries and consequently for the total energy system¹⁴. With action on carbon leakage the challenge for the transition in the energy system would be smaller given lower efforts in parts of the system. Such results are however modified through countervailing effects from lower world fossil fuel prices under global action that encourage somewhat higher energy consumption and emissions. In any case, the implementation of measures will be crucial. The real difference for industrial and thereby climate policy might come from the concrete design of policy instruments that is not discussed in this Energy Roadmap Impact Assessment (e.g. special provisions on ETS for EII).

From the analysis undertaken for the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap it can be concluded that under fragmented action with the EU reducing emissions much more than other regions, certain industries supplying low carbon technologies would benefit from improved competitiveness due to higher internal demand and first mover advantages. However, EII would suffer from higher costs for allowances and/or significant mitigation costs in order to avoid the need to purchase such allowances. Furthermore, under fragmented action they

¹³ Impact assessment report SEC(2011)288 final, section 5

would not benefit from the fuel and electricity price reductions stemming from a global climate deal that lowers world fossil fuel prices.

This situation of fragmented action might require countervailing action to combat carbon leakage, which was investigated in the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap, notably by exploring a scenario, in which energy intensive industries (iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, non metallic minerals, paper and pulp industries) would benefit from the same ETS prices that prevail in the reference scenario, whereas other sectors would be exposed to higher carbon costs. These provisions have only a limited impact on the CO₂ emission reduction of all sectors, which instead of reaching minus 86% on 1990 under fragmented action (85% under global action) would amount to 78% with these specific provisions for EII. Clearly, the CO₂ emission reduction for EII, i.e. their level of effort, would be reduced more markedly, falling from 87% reduction below 1990 under fragmented action (88% under global action) to only 51% by 2050.

These measures keeping the ETS price for energy intensive industries at the reference case levels lead to significant cost savings for purchasing fuel, electricity, steam and energy using equipment. Compared with the reference case situation with no additional climate action, the average costs in 2011-2050 decrease by 6 bn €(08) annually over 40 years. Higher energy, especially electricity prices from decarbonisation action together with the still significant carbon price signal lead to significant energy savings in energy intensive industries (22.7% in 2050 from Reference).

These cost savings take into account that electricity prices rise significantly under fragmented action (7% in 2050 compared with Reference) and this to a higher degree than under global action given that the cost reducing effect through lower fossil fuel input prices (global action reducing world fossil fuel demand) would not materialise. Electricity prices in 2050 would be 6 % lower on average under global climate action compared with fragmented action with specific measures for EII.

Under global action, the energy saving effect of energy intensive industries is reinforced through higher carbon prices, entailing even greater energy savings. Combined with lower fossil fuel import and therefore final consumer prices, there would be additional cost savings, amounting to 21 bn €per year from 2011 to 2050 when comparing global climate action with fragmented action with less effort for EII.¹⁵

Table 47 compares the energy related results of decarbonisation scenario under fragmented action with specific carbon leakage measures for energy intensive industries with the Reference case. It includes also a comparison between global action and fragmented action with these specific measures for energy intensive industries. The energy results for this analysis are taken from the energy modelling results for the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap, which includes, in addition to the Reference scenario, the Fragmented action, effective technology and less effort for EII scenario and the Effective Technology Global Action scenario.

¹⁵ The energy modelling did not include possible changes in value added of energy intensive industries as a reaction to climate policy measures. However, the low carbon economy roadmap includes a complementary analysis of macroeconomic and industrial competitiveness effects of a fragmented action scenario (SEC (2011)650, section 5.1.3) which provides further insights on these issues.

The effective technology scenarios are driven by carbon prices and assume the absence of significant obstacles for technology penetration, especially CCS and nuclear, as well as the absence of specific strong push for RES and energy efficiency. The rationale of these scenarios is similar to the Diversified Supply Technologies scenario, which includes however recent policy initiatives, especially on energy efficiency and energy taxation as well as recent changes in nuclear policies. The most relevant comparison of energy results when dealing with carbon leakage in the case of Fragmented action, effective technology and less effort for EII is therefore in relation to Reference (no additional climate action), on the one hand, and Effective Technology under global climate action, on the other.

Table 47: Comparison of energy results for 2050* between fragmented action with specific measures for energy intensive industries (FAEII) and Reference as well as between global action and FAEII

	Less effort for EII compared with Reference	Global action compared with less effort for EII
Final energy consumption		
EII	-22.7%	-11.2%
Other sectors	-33.6%	+1.6%
Primary energy consumption	-24.1%	+2.5%
Gross electricity generation **	+10.3%	+6.6%
Average electricity prices	+7.2%	-5.7%
Energy related CO2 emissions	-72.4%	+1.2%
Import dependency	-26.2 pp +26.6 pp +30.1%	+1.3 pp -0.3 pp +1.2%
RES share in gross final energy demand		
Cumulative investment expenditure in power generation	-6 bn	-21 bn
Average annual fuel, electricity and equipment costs		

* For investment expenditure and costs this comparison relates to the 40 year period up to 2050

** including new uses, such as hydrogen as a means for electricity storage and for feeding into the gas grid thereby contributing to decarbonisation by lowering the carbon content of the gas supplied

Climate action with specific measures for EII against carbon leakages leads to quite significant energy consequences in 2050 compared to reference regarding energy consumption, fuel and electricity costs, prices and emissions. Import dependency would fall strongly, whereas the RES share would rise to a large extent. Investment in power generation would also need to rise strongly while average costs would fall significantly.

Energy consumption of EII would drop further significantly when undertaking decarbonisation in the context of global action, as EII would face higher carbon prices in this case (the same as other sectors). The small increase of energy consumption and emission levels (outside EII) when moving to global action stem from the markedly lower fossil fuel prices under globally reduced demand. Energy related results are either reinforced, if the policy response to climate change moved from fragmented action with specific carbon

leakage measures for EII to global action without such measures, or they are modified reflecting the impacts from lower fossil fuel prices.

Energy related expenditures of households

Affordability of energy services as regards fuel and electricity costs but also equipment (insulation, more efficient appliances, etc) is one of the essential elements of the analysis. The sector that is mostly concerned is households. All decarbonisation scenarios show significant fuel savings compared to the Reference and CPI scenarios but also higher costs for energy appliances, boilers and insulation. Energy related expenditures for heating and cooling of households as well as for lighting and appliances almost double from around 2000 EUR'08/year today to 3800 to 3900 EUR'08 in 2050 in the Reference and CPI scenarios reflecting rising fuel and electricity prices and increasing direct household investments in energy efficiency. Expenditures per household amount to some 4500 EUR'08 in most decarbonisation scenarios in 2050, with expenditure per household reaching some 4800 €(08) and almost 4900 €(08) in the Energy Efficiency and high RES scenarios respectively.

It is important to note that per capita income in 2050 will also almost double from today's level, but also that households will be composed of fewer members reflecting aging and changing lifestyles. Energy costs per household exceed the Reference/CPI case level by 16-17% in 2050 in most decarbonisation scenarios. They are 25-27% higher in the Energy Efficiency and High RES scenarios, as these scenarios are particularly intensive in investment. While these costs might be affordable by an average household, vulnerable consumers might need specific support to cope with increased expenditures due to decarbonisation.

Households spend money on transport services, too. Such costs concern expenses on tickets for rail, bus, metro, air and other travel as well as costs for purchasing privately owned vehicles and paying for other fuel and operational expenses. These transport costs per household would even almost triple by 2050 reaching 3900 €(08) and 4100 €(08) in the Reference and CPI case, respectively. The strong growth of such costs reflects rising oil prices as well as changes in the vehicle fleet towards more efficient cars (hybrids, plug in hybrids, electric cars) that involve higher costs¹⁶. In the decarbonisation scenarios, transport related energy costs per households are lower in 2050 than under Reference or CPI developments, markedly so (broadly around 10%) under Diversified Supply Technologies and delayed CCS, given substantial improvements in energy efficiency in transport and limited price increases with respect to reference for transport fuel.

Relating the costs of households for stationary energy use (heating, appliances, etc) plus those for transport to household expenditure gives the following picture. The share of energy in household expenditure rises over time in all scenarios from 10% in 2005 to around 16% in 2030, decreasing thereafter to around 15-16% by 2050. Among the decarbonisation scenarios, the Delayed CCS and the Diversified Supply Technology scenarios have costs at the lower end of this range, whereas the High RES and Energy efficiency scenarios show 2050 costs at the upper end of the range.

¹⁶ It should be noted that costs of engines and propulsion cannot be separated from the rest of vehicle costs and that these numbers include therefore the costs for owning the entire vehicle.

Table 48: Energy related expenditures of household for stationary use and transport

%	2005	Reference		Scenario 1 bis	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Share of energy related costs in household expenditure	9.9	15.9	14.6	16.1	15.1
<i>of which stationary uses</i>	5.7	8.0	7.3	7.9	7.3
<i>of which transportation uses</i>	4.2	7.9	7.3	8.2	7.8
		Scenario 2		Scenario 3	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Share of energy related costs in household expenditure		16.5	16.1	15.9	15.4
<i>of which stationary uses</i>		7.9	9.1	7.5	8.4
<i>of which transportation uses</i>		8.6	7.0	8.4	6.9
		Scenario 4		Scenario 5	
		2030	2050	2030	2050
Share of energy related costs in household expenditure		15.8	16.4	15.9	15.1
<i>of which stationary uses</i>		7.7	9.2	7.5	8.5
<i>of which transportation uses</i>		8.1	7.1	8.4	6.6
		Scenario 6			
		2030	2050		
Share of energy related costs in household expenditure		16.1	15.5		
<i>of which stationary uses</i>		7.5	8.5		
<i>of which transportation uses</i>		8.6	7.0		

Whereas companies enjoy long term energy costs relative to value added that are lower (or at most as high) as such costs under current policy initiatives, the 2050 energy costs of households relative to household expenditure generally exceed such costs without strong decarbonisation albeit only to a rather small extent, especially under Delayed CCS and Diversified Supply Technologies.

Electricity prices

Another important indicator on costs relates to final consumer prices especially the prices of electricity for industrial, household and services consumers as well as the average price. Electricity prices are calculated in such a way that total costs of power generation, balancing, transmission and distribution are recovered, ensuring that investments can be financed. Table 49 shows the average price for electricity in the EU27 for different sectors; the residential sector has the highest user price and industry the lowest as it is currently the case. In 2050, average electricity costs are highest in High RES scenario reaching 199 €MWh. The lowest electricity prices are in Diversified supply and Energy efficiency scenario, with prices below the Reference and Current Policy Initiatives scenarios because of cheaper procurement of fossil fuels under global climate action.

Average prices of electricity are rising compared to current levels until 2030 and continue increasing in the High RES scenario. In the Energy Efficiency and Diversified Supply Technology scenarios, electricity prices remain similar to those in the Reference/CPI scenario up to 2030 thanks to lower fossil fuel input costs with lower world market prices. With

somewhat higher investment or ETS costs, the other decarbonisation scenarios have slightly higher costs in 2030, exceeding Reference/CPI by around 5%. By 2050, the average price exceeds reference/CPI level markedly in the High RES scenario (around 30%) to recover costs for the high generation capacity needs including for back-up and for greater grid and storage capacities, while it remains almost at that level in the Low nuclear case (+4%). In the Diversified Supply Technologies and Energy Efficiency scenarios, electricity prices in 2050 are even below those in the Reference/CPI cases, whereas beneficial effects from lower import prices are compensated by effects from restricted choices on nuclear or delayed penetration of CCS in the respective scenarios. Electricity prices are already slightly higher than reference in Current policy Initiatives scenario reflecting less nuclear in power generation at somewhat higher costs.

It should also be noted that prices rise strongly up to 2020/30, but that after 2030 prices either fall or show an average annual price increase that is much smaller than in the period 2005-2030, which applies in particular for the High RES scenario.

Table 49: EU27 average electricity prices¹⁷

(Euro'08 per MWhe)	Reference		Scenario 1bis		
	2005	2030	2050	2030	2050
Average price(*)	109.3	154.8	151.1	156.0	156.9
<i>Industry</i>	74.7	107.0	104.2	105.4	102.4
<i>Households</i>	140.7	207.2	201.3	211.7	212.3
<i>Services</i>	131.3	173.1	166.3	173.9	172.7
(Euro'08 per MWhe)	Scenario 2		Scenario 3		
	2030	2050	2030	2050	
Average price(*)	154.4	146.7	159.6	146.2	
<i>Industry</i>	106.8	110.5	111.2	108.8	
<i>Households</i>	206.4	195.3	208.0	194.5	
<i>Services</i>	168.9	161.5	171.8	159.8	
(Euro'08 per MWhe)	Scenario 4		Scenario 5		
	2030	2050	2030	2050	
Average price(*)	164.4	198.9	160.4	151.9	
<i>Industry</i>	112.6	134.9	111.7	114.1	
<i>Households</i>	215.6	285.6	209.1	200.9	
<i>Services</i>	176.9	223.8	172.8	165.4	
(Euro'08 per MWhe)	Scenario 6				
	2030	2050			
Average price(*)	168.2	157.2			
<i>Industry</i>	118.8	119.2			
<i>Households</i>	218.4	208.3			
<i>Services</i>	180.9	171.6			

(*): Average price over all consumer types, including final consumers and energy branch

Diesel prices

Another pertinent indicator on costs across scenarios is the price of diesel, which is relevant for both passenger transport (in private cars and buses/coaches) and freight transport.

Prices for diesel in transport in CPI and the decarbonisation scenarios reflect the new energy taxation directive as well as different bio-diesel blends. The energy system changes between scenarios cause only limited changes to end-user diesel prices. The strong decline in diesel prices between CPI and decarbonisation scenarios in 2030 reflects oil and product import price savings. This effect is compensated in 2050 by the impact of a significantly higher biofuel penetration in the diesel market.

¹⁷ Average electricity prices in this table relate to a somewhat different customer base compared with electricity prices shown in Part A by including also energy branch customers in addition to those in final demand sectors; this explains the slight differences in average prices (e.g. for 2005 between 109.3 €when including the energy branch and 110.1 €when excluding it).

Table 50: Average EU27 diesel (including blended biodiesel) end -user prices for private transport¹⁸

		2005	2030	2050
Reference	(EUR(08)/toe)	1271	1877	2250
CPI	% diff. to Reference	0%	20%	16%
Energy Efficiency		0%	3%	17%
Diversified Supply Technology		0%	3%	19%
High RES		0%	3%	21%
Delayed CCS		0%	2%	18%
Low Nuclear		0%	3%	22%

2.8 Conclusions

The Commission services conducted a model-based analysis of decarbonisation scenarios exploring energy consequences of the European Council's objective to reach 80% GHG reductions by 2050 (as compared to 1990), provided that industrialised countries as a group undertake similar efforts. These scenarios explore also the energy security and competitiveness dimension of such energy developments. Businesses as usual projections show only half the GHG emission reductions needed; increased import dependency, in particular for gas; and rising electricity prices and energy costs. Several decarbonisation scenarios highlighting the implications of pursuing each of the four main decarbonisation routes for the energy sector – energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear and CCS - were examined by modelling a high and low end for each of them. The model relies on a series of input assumptions and internal mechanisms to provide the outputs.

The most relevant assumptions and mechanisms of the model

- All scenarios were conducted under the hypothesis that the whole world is acting on climate change which leads to lower demand for fossil fuel prices and subsequently lower prices.
- The model assumes perfect foresight regarding, policy thrust, energy prices and technology developments which assures a very low level of uncertainty for investors, enabling them to make particular cost-effective investment choices without stranded investments. There is also no problem with uncertainty on whether all the infrastructure and other interrelated investment (e.g. grid connections) needed to make a particular investment work will be in place in time.
- Regulatory framework in model allows for investments to be built and costs fully recovered.
- The model assumes a "representative" or average household or consumer while in reality there is a more diversified picture of investors and consumers.
- The model assumes continuous improvements of technologies.

The model-based analysis has shown that decarbonisation of the energy sector is feasible; that it can be achieved through various combinations of energy efficiency, renewables, nuclear and CCS contributions; and that the costs are affordable. The aim of the analysis was not to pick preferred options, a choice that would be surrounded with great uncertainty, but to show some prototype of pathways to decarbonise the energy system while improving energy security and competitiveness and identify common features from scenario analysis.

¹⁸ The average EU price of diesel is calculated with the weighted average of country prices; differences between scenarios are therefore also due to different amounts of diesel used in the countries per scenario; in addition there are different blending ratios; the different taxation regime between the Reference scenario and the other scenarios including CPI reflecting the new proposal for the energy taxation directive.

Common elements to scenario analysis

- There is a need for an integrated approach, e.g.; decarbonisation of heating and transport relies heavily on the availability of decarbonised electricity supply, which in turn depends on very low carbon investments in generation capacity as well as significant grid expansions and smartening.
- Electricity (given its high efficiency and emission free nature at use) makes major inroads in decarbonisation scenarios reaching a 36-39% share in 2050 (almost doubling from current level and becoming the most important final energy source). Decarbonisation in 2050 will require a virtually carbon free electricity sector in the EU, and around 60% CO₂ reduction by 2030.
- Significant energy efficiency improvements happen in all decarbonisation scenarios. One unit of GDP in 2050 requires around 70% less energy input compared with 2005. The average annual improvement in energy intensity amounts to around 2.5% pa.
- The share of renewables rises substantially in all scenarios, achieving at least 55% in gross final energy consumption in 2050, up 45 percentage points from the current level (a high RES case explores the consequences of raising this share to 75%).
- The increased use of renewable energy as well as energy efficiency improvements require modern, reliable and smart infrastructure including electrical storage.
- Nuclear has a significant role in decarbonisation in Member States where it is accepted, especially if CCS deployment were delayed.
- CCS contributes significantly towards decarbonisation in most scenarios with a particularly strong role in case there were problems with nuclear investment and deployment. Developing CCS can be also seen as an insurance against energy efficiency, RES and nuclear (in some Member States) delivering less or not that quickly.
- All scenarios show a transition from high fuel/operational expenditures to high capital expenditure.
- Substantial changes in the period up to 2030 will be crucial for a cost-efficient long term transition to a decarbonised world¹⁹. Economic costs are manageable if action starts early so that the restructuring of the energy system goes in parallel with investment cycles thereby avoiding stranded investment as well as costly lock-ins of medium carbon intensive technology.
- The costs of such deep decarbonisation are low in all scenarios given lower fuel procurement costs with cost savings shown mainly in scenarios relying on all four main decarbonisation options.
- Costs are unequally distributed across sectors, with households shouldering the greatest cost increase due to higher costs of direct energy efficiency expenditures in appliances, vehicles and insulation.
- The external EU energy bill for importing oil, gas and coal will be substantially lower under decarbonisation due to substantial reduction in import quantities and prices dependent on global climate action lowering world fossil fuel demand substantially.

When considering these scenario results it might be useful to consider as well that energy supply structures are being transformed. Today we have, for the most part, concentrated rather invisible items, such as mines, import terminals, large power plants outside towns, and underground pipelines for energy dense fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Under decarbonisation we would increasingly have well visible land consuming configurations, such as very large numbers of wind turbines, solar devices, biomass plantation, and additional transmission lines. This might raise issues with **public acceptance** and local opposition.

Deployment of nuclear technologies is fraught with acceptance problems in a large number of Member States. CCS is already now experiencing local opposition in some Member States. Temporary delays in CCS were modelled but not the complete unavailability of this option. Permanent unavailability of CCS could mean that decarbonisation would almost entirely hinge upon very strong progress with RES penetration (and energy efficiency) given the

¹⁹ Scenarios for the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap of March 2011 show the additional costs of delayed action.

existing limitations to nuclear with many Member States having opted out. In the high RES scenario with much energy efficiency (discussed above), the CCS role is very small, given the predominance of RES, requiring in turn large efforts in terms of financing and finding accepted sites for very substantial investments in production and transmission.

Some policy relevant conclusions can be drawn based both on the results of the scenario analysis as well as on a comparison of the hypothetical situation of ideal market and technological conditions needed for modelling purposes and what is found in the much more complex reality.

Implications for future policy making

- Successful decarbonisation while preserving competitiveness of the EU economy is possible. Without global climate action, carbon leakage might be an issue and appropriate instruments could be needed to preserve the competitiveness of energy intensive industries.
- Predictability and stability of policy and regulatory framework creates a favourable environment for low carbon investments. While the regulatory framework to 2020 is mainly given, discussions about policies for 2020-2030 should start now leading to firm decisions that provide certainty for long-term low-carbon investments. Uncertainty can lead to a sub-optimal situation where only investment with low initial capital costs is realised.
- A well functioning internal market is necessary to encourage investment where it is most cost-effective. However, the process of decarbonisation brings new challenges in the context, for example, of electricity price determination in power exchanges: deep decarbonisation increases substantially the bids based on zero marginal costs leading in many instances to prices rather close to zero, not allowing cost recovery in power generation. Similarly, the necessary expansion and innovation of grids for decarbonisation may be hampered if regulated transmission and distribution focuses on costs minimisation alone. Building of adequate infrastructure needs to be assured and supported either by adequate regulation and/or public funding (e.g. financed by auctioning revenues).
- Energy efficiency tends to show better results in a model than in reality. Energy efficiency improvements are often hampered by split incentives, cash problems of some group of customers; imperfect knowledge and foresight leading to lock-in of some outdated technologies, etc. There is thus a strong need for targeted support policies and public funding supporting more energy efficient consumer choices.
- Strong support should be given to R&D in order to bring down costs of low-carbon technologies.
- Due attention should be given to public acceptance of all low carbon technologies and infrastructure as well willingness of consumers to undertake implied changes and bear higher costs. This will require the engagement of both the public and private sectors early in the process.
- Social policies might need to be considered early in the process given that households shoulder large parts of the costs. While these costs might be affordable by an average household, vulnerable consumers might need specific support to cope with increased expenditures. In addition, transition to a decarbonised economy may involve shifts to more highly skilled jobs, with a possibly difficult adaptation period.
- Flexibility. The future is uncertain and nobody can predict it. That is why preserving flexibility is important for a cost efficient approach, but certain decisions are needed already at this stage in order to start the process that needs innovation and investment, for which investors require a reasonable degree of certainty from reduced policy and regulatory risk.
- External dimension, in particular relations with energy suppliers, should be dealt with pro-actively and at an early stage given the implications of global decarbonisation on fossil fuel export revenues and the necessary production and energy transport investments during the transition phase to decarbonisation; new areas for co-operation could include renewable energy supplies and technology development.

ATTACHMENT 2: ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INTERCONNECTIONS AND MODELLING OF ELECTRICITY TRADE

Short description of the model

The electricity trade model of PRIMES covers all countries in the European continent except countries of the CIS and Turkey. Interconnector capacities at the various country borders are determined exogenously.

The model performs unit commitment, endogenous use of interconnectors (with given capacities and Net Transfer Capacities (NTC)) and also optimal power generation capacity expansion planning in a perfect foresight manner until 2050. Simulations of different electricity demand levels with the model allow identification of bottlenecks and of the amount of investment in interconnectors necessary to remove such bottlenecks.

The model covers demand both for electricity and CHP steam/heat, as given from results of the entire PRIMES model. Demand for electricity and for steam/heat is supposed to be given and is represented through two typical days (for winter and summer).

Investment in new power plants is endogenous. The rate of use of power capacities and interconnectors is endogenous. Regarding the use of interconnectors the model performs a linear Direct Current optimal power flow under oriented NTC constraints defined per each couple of countries. The model makes distinction between AC lines and DC lines, the use of the latter being controlled by operators. All interconnectors existing today or planned to be constructed in the future are represented (one by one) in the model.

Among the inputs, the model considers non linear cost-supply curves for fuels used in power generation and non linear investment cost curves for nuclear and renewable energy power plants, which are a function of total installed capacity (unit investment costs increase as approaching the potential).

The electricity model, used in stage 1, is identical to the model used in the entire PRIMES model, but could be used with endogenous electricity trade only for the work during stage 1 because of very long computing times for each model run when iterations are performed between demand and supply and for meeting carbon targets.

Assumptions for the modelling exercise

All data about NTCs and interconnection capacities were taken from ENTSOe databases. Information on new constructions was taken from the latest “Ten-year network development plan 2010-2020”, complemented, where necessary, with information from the Nordic Pool TSOs and the Energy Community (for South East Europe). Some of the planned new constructions would justify increase of NTCs values until 2020, as mentioned in the ENTSOe’s TYNDP document. Other mentioned new constructions regard directly the building of new interconnection lines which are introduced as such in the model database. According to assumptions agreed with the Energy DG of the European Commission, the following three cases were formulated regarding the NTC values:

- a) NTC-0: keeping the NTC values of 2020, which are much higher than today, unchanged until 2050; the projection of NTC values to the year 2020 from today

levels follows a study by KEMA, except few cases either because the links were not included in that study or because ENTSOe's NTC values announced for 2010-2011 were exceeding the KEMA's values. This assumption does not use the TYNDP information about new constructions aiming at increasing the NTC values in the future, except indirectly if in some cases the KEMA values for 2020 increase from today's levels.

- b) NTC-2: apply a doubling of 2020 NTC values between 2020 and 2050 and interpolate linearly between 2020 and 2050; increase capacities of interconnectors where necessary so as to keep NTC values lower than total interconnection capacity by individual couples of countries. Some additional DC lines were added (linking Italy with western Balkans).
- c) NTC-4: apply a quadrupling of 2020 NTC values by 2050 and interpolate with extension of interconnection capacities where needed.

Two energy demand and pricing contexts were considered to analyze the implications from the above mentioned NTC assumptions, which are as follows:

1. Reference scenario: demand, prices, taxes and ETS carbon prices are taken as identical to the DG ENER Reference scenario. Some adjustments on electricity demand figures were made only for year 2010, based on monthly statistics for 2010, in order to be able to simulate the true NTC values for this year.
2. Decarbonisation scenario: demand, prices and ETS carbon prices, as well as the parameters mirroring RES facilitation and other policies, are taken from the DG CLIMA "Decarbonisation scenario under effective technologies and global climate action" scenario.

Discussion of model results for the Reference scenario with three NTC value cases

The model results show that the NTC values retained for the year 2020 do not lead to substantial changes compared to results for the standard Reference scenario, i.e. the Reference scenario referred to in the Low Carbon Economy Roadmap). The countries projected to be net exporters in the standard reference scenario remain so in the model results presented here; the same applies to countries projected to be net importers in the standard reference scenario. There are differences in the magnitude of exports or imports for the year 2020, as for example for Belgium, Portugal, Lithuania and Latvia (higher net imports), for Hungary and Denmark (lower net imports) and for Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and Bulgaria (more net exports). It is reminded that for the standard Reference scenario import-exports of electricity were derived following a different methodology, which applied common balancing by region, contrasting the pan-European balancing applied for the model runs presented here.

NTC-0 case.

Regarding the scenario with NTC values remaining unchanged at the year 2020, the model results provide information about congestion by considering whether the NTC constraints are binding or close to be binding for couples of countries. The findings from this analysis regarding the projected NTC values for 2020 are summarized below

- Link Switzerland-Germany: appears congested and NTC is 32% of capacity
- Link Germany-Poland: appears congested and NTC is 17% of capacity
- Link Denmark-Sweden: appears congested and NTC is 54% of capacity
- Link Austria-Italy: appears very congested and NTC is 16% of capacity
- Link Italy-Slovenia: appears congested and NTC is 15% of capacity

- Link Austria-Hungary: appears congested and NTC is 31% of capacity
- Link Slovenia-Croatia: appears congested and NTC is 18% of capacity
- Links in the Balkans (FYROM-Greece, Albania-Greece, Bulgaria-Greece, Serbia-FYROM, Romania-Serbia, Serbia-Albania, Bulgaria-FYROM) appear very congested and NTC are below 30% of capacity, except Greece-Bulgaria NTC which is 68% of capacity

Congestion is detected in the model runs due to NTCs that are only a small part of existing capacities. One option for dealing with congestion would be to increase NTC without necessarily construct new lines. From the above overview it can be seen that the congestions after 2020 remain between Germany and neighbours to the east and south, between Austria, Italy, Slovenia, and Hungary, and finally in the Balkans, both within the Balkans and the linkages with northern neighbours.

NTC-2 and NTC-4 cases

The NTC-2 and NTC-4 cases assume doubling and quadrupling of NTC values, respectively from 2020 to 2050, with linear interpolation applied between 2020 and 2050. The model results show that this way of uniformly increasing the NTC values does not really solve the problem of systematic congestions mentioned above for the case NTC-0. These congestions are removed only in the case NTC-4 and after 2030, with the exception of the Austria-Italy and Germany-Poland links, which remain congested until 2050 despite the quadrupled NTCs. The congestion problems in the Balkans are removed only in the NTC-4 case after 2030, but the area remains strongly congested under the NTC-2 assumptions. The congestions in links with Germany (Switzerland, Poland, Czech Rep. and Austria) are not removed in the NTC-2 case.

The doubling and quadrupling of NTCs values do not provide any advantages concerning the large list of links, which are not found congested under the NTC-0 assumptions.

The doubling of NTCs under the assumptions of NTC-2 case lead to lower rates of use of interconnection capacities (reported as percentage of NTCs), compared with NTC-0 results in the following cases:

- UK-Ireland: 17 percentage points less use
- France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany: between 15 and 30 percentage points less use
- Nordic area: around 15 percentage points less use
- Czech Rep., Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Croatia: between 20 and 30 percentage points less use
- Latvia-Estonia: 20 percentage points less use

Passing from the doubling to the quadrupling implies even lower rates of use of interconnection possibilities.

Both cases NTC-2 and NTC-4 have adverse implications on the rate of use of DC lines leading to lower rates of use compared to case NTC-0, which under NTC-4 are close to zero in some cases. The NTC constraints help using the DC links for which the NTC values are usually equal to the interconnection capacities. Excessively high NTC constraints, which also

mean more AC links, imply much less use of DC lines, which of course is unrealistic, as the DC lines correspond to today known constructions and are furthermore expensive. So the companies would not build so many new AC lines as the ones corresponding to NTC-4 on economic grounds including the adverse effects on DC lines.

A major issue with NTC-2 and NTC-4 cases regards the investment cost implicitly associated with the increase of interconnection capacities stemming from the doubling and quadrupling of NTC values. Total interconnection capacity is projected to increase by 43% in 2020 compared to 2010 levels, as a result of implementing the construction program of the TYNDP. In NTC-0 the capacity remains roughly unchanged until 2050. But in NTC-2 the capacity has to increase by 95% in 2050 compared to 2020 levels and in NTC-4 this increase is 277%. Such a construction program exceeds by far capacity requirements and would unnecessarily penalize costs and electricity prices in the scenarios.

According to the model results, we obtain the following changes in energy terms from NTC-2 and NTC-4 assumptions compared to NTC-0 results:

- Total volume of electricity traded increases by 5% in NTC-2 and by 8% in NTC-4 compared to NTC-0 in cumulative terms for the period 2015-2050. It is evident that the additional cost of interconnectors cannot be justified by such small increases in total traded volumes (i.e. adding absolute values of flows between countries).
- Total electricity production costs decrease by 0.13% in NTC-2 and by 0.23% in NTC-4 compared to NTC-0 in cumulative terms 2015-2050
- CO2 emissions from electricity production decrease by 0.8% in NTC-2 and by 0.9% in NTC-4 compared to NTC-0 in cumulative terms 2015-2050
- Nuclear and RES cumulative production are found slightly higher in NTC-2 and NTC-4 compared to NTC-0, but the changes are less than 1% in cumulative terms.

It can therefore be concluded that the NTC expansion according to the NTC-2 and NTC-4 assumptions are not needed for the functioning of the electricity system and would entail high unnecessary cost without providing any noticeable benefit. These assumptions do not solve the serious congestion issues, do not provide gains for the non congested areas and have adverse effects on the economics of DC lines.

The conclusion for a Reference or Current Policy Initiatives framework is therefore to follow an approach that focuses on identified bottlenecks. For stage 2 of the modelling it is appropriate to increase NTC values and interconnection capacities after 2020 in a selective way, with priority to areas that would be congested in the future according to the reference scenario results. Such areas are the southern and eastern connections of Germany, the area linking Italy, Austria and Slovenia, the linkages of Balkans with northern neighbours and the linkages within Balkans. Some NTC additions should be also made for the linkages Denmark-Sweden and Latvia-Estonia.

With lower electricity demand due to the assumed strong energy efficiency policies, these results also hold for the Current Policy Initiatives scenario.

Discussion of model results for a Decarbonisation scenario with three NTC value cases

Under the assumptions of the decarbonisation scenario, total demand for electricity (in the 32 countries included in the model) increases by 15% in 2050 compared to the Reference scenario for year 2050. ,

It is assumed that the renewable facilitation policies develop in all countries in favour of domestic renewable potential. The scenario does not assume inflows of RES electricity from outside EU countries (e.g. North Africa) and does not include the possibility of exploitation of offshore wind located at long distance from the coasts.

The results from the model show that the NTC values retained for the period until 2020 do not alter the electricity trade pattern projected in previous decarbonisation exercises and compared to the Reference scenario.

The congestions identified in the context of the decarbonisation scenario for the year 2020 are the same as in the context of the reference scenario (see previous section).

Under the assumptions of the NTC-0 case the results show congestions similar to those found for the reference scenario, i.e. in south and east of Germany, in the Balkans, in the northern connections of the Balkans, in the linkages between Italy, Austria and Slovenia. Some additional congestion cases, found in the context of decarbonisation, relate to the link Germany-Sweden, Norway-UK and Germany-UK which are based on DC-links and do not concern the NTC values.

The doubling of NTC values under the assumptions of the NTC-2 case does not help removing the congestions. The quadrupling of NTC values (NTC-4 case) helps removing the congestions only in the long term, after 2040. So the linear interpolation method seems not to be useful as it brings little benefits and entails high costs for building new interconnectors. Increase of NTC values in a selective way and at an early stage after 2020 seems more suitable.

In the context of the decarbonisation scenario, the NTC-2 case allows increase of total volumes traded by 12% when compared to NTC-0. The increase obtained for the NTC-4 case is 14% (up from NTC-0). NTC-2 reduces total power generation costs roughly by 0.85% in cumulative terms compared to NTC-0. In NTC-4, the additional effect on power generation costs is smaller, NTC-4 power generation costs are 0.2% lower compared with NTC-2. It is important to note that these statements related to power generation costs, and that the move from NTC-0 to NTC-2 and even more NTC-4 involves large costs for grid investment. NTC-2 has small impacts favouring slightly more nuclear and RES generation, whereas NTC-4 add very little to NTC-2 effects.

Overall conclusions on decarbonisation scenarios (except for those with very strong reliance on RES)

Following these economic modelling results, the approach for further modelling was chosen to start from NTC-0 assumptions and to increase in selective way NTC values immediately after 2020 for the linkages found to be congested. This concerns interconnections around Germany, in Austria-Italy-Slovenia, Balkans and Denmark-Sweden.

For very high RES penetration, such linkages may not be sufficient. Therefore, this case has been examined separately. The results of this analysis are reported in the following chapter.

Assumptions about interconnections in the Decarbonisation scenario with High RES deployment both domestically and in the North Sea

Under the assumptions of this decarbonisation scenario, full exploitation of off-shore wind potential at North Sea is foreseen. In this modelling, exploiting the highest possible offshore wind potential is envisaged for Denmark, the UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Belgium and Ireland, according to the division of the sea in economic zones. Data on potentials come from published reports (e.g. EEA); the additional potentials, compared to standard RES scenario, are remarkably high for Norway, UK and Netherlands. It is assumed that a dense DC interconnection system will develop mainly offshore but also partly onshore, to facilitate power flows from the North Sea offshore wind parks.

After several model runs with different DC topology configurations and after considering elimination of congestions arising from wind offshore power flows, we have concluded to the following assumptions about the additional DC interconnections:

In MW	Investment in additional new interconnectors in the 4.1 scenario – North Sea						
		2030	2035	2040	2045	2050	Total
Ireland	UK	0	0	1000	0	0	1000
Spain	France	1000	0	1000	0	0	2000
France	Germany	0	0	1000	1000	0	2000
France	Belgium	0	0	1000	0	0	1000
Belgium	Netherlands	0	0	1000	1000	0	2000
Netherlands	Germany	0	500	1000	1000	0	2500
UK	France	1000	0	1000	500	0	2500
UK	Belgium	1000	0	500	0	0	1500
UK	Netherlands	0	0	1000	0	0	1000
UK	Germany	1000	0	1000	1000	0	3000
Norway	Belgium	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	5000
Norway	Netherlands	1000	1000	500	500	0	3000
Norway	Germany	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	5000
Germany	Denmark	0	1000	2000	1000	500	4500
Norway	Denmark	1000	0	0	0	0	1000
UK	Norway	0	1000	0	1000	0	2000
Norway	Sweden	1000	0	0	0	0	1000
Sweden	Poland	1000	2000	2000	2000	3000	10000
Netherlands	Denmark	500	500	1000	500	0	2500
Denmark	Sweden	500	500	1000	1000	1000	4000
Germany	Poland	0	1000	1000	1500	1500	5000
Denmark	Poland	0	1000	2000	2500	500	6000
	Total	11000	10500	21000	16500	8500	67500

The NTC values are identical to the DC capacities, as assumed for all DC lines.

The congestions in this scenario are related to the wheeling of electricity from the North Sea region to consumption centres. The links of Sweden with Poland, Sweden with Lithuania, Austria with Italy, France with Italy and links in the Balkan region appear to be congested. In this scenario, the electricity trade changes drastically. The United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway export large amount of electricity while France, Belgium Germany, Italy, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland become or remain importing countries. This changes the results for the decarbonisation scenario as regards several countries.

ATTACHMENT 3: SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE MODELS USED

The scenarios were derived with the PRIMES model by a consortium led by the National Technical University of Athens (E3MLab), supported by some more specialised models (e.g. GEM-E3 model that has been used for projections for the value added by branch of activity and PROMETHEUS model that has been deployed for projections of world energy prices).

GEM-E3

The GEM-E3 (World and Europe) model is an applied general equilibrium model, simultaneously representing World regions and European countries, linked through endogenous bilateral trade flows and environmental flows. The European model is including the EU countries, the Accession Countries and Switzerland. The world model version includes 18 regions among which a grouping of European Union states. GEM-E3 aims at covering the interactions between the economy, the energy system and the environment. It is a comprehensive model of the economy, the productive sectors, consumption, price formation of commodities, labour and capital, investment and dynamic growth. The model is dynamic, recursive over time, driven by accumulation of capital and equipment. Technology progress is explicitly represented in the production function, either exogenous or endogenous, depending on R&D expenditure by private and public sector and taking into account spillovers effects. The current GEM-E3 version has been updated to the GTAP7 database (base year 2004) and has been updated with the latest Eurostat statistics for the EU Member States.

PRIMES model

The PRIMES model simulates the response of energy consumers and the energy supply systems to different pathways of economic development and exogenous constraints and drivers. It is a modelling system that simulates a market equilibrium solution in the European Union and its member states. The model determines the equilibrium by finding the prices of each energy form such that the quantity producers find best to supply match the quantity consumers wish to use. The equilibrium is forward-looking and includes dynamic relationships for capital accumulation and technology vintages. The model is behavioural formulating agents' decisions according to microeconomic theory, but it also represents in an explicit and detailed way the available energy demand and supply technologies and pollution abatement technologies. The system reflects considerations about market competition economics, industry structure, energy /environmental policies and regulation. These are conceived so as to influence market behaviour of energy system agents. The modular structure of PRIMES reflects a distribution of decision making among agents that decide individually about their supply, demand, combined supply and demand, and prices. Then the market integrating part of PRIMES simulates market clearing.

PRIMES is a partial equilibrium model simulating the entire energy system both in demand and in supply; it contains a mixed representations of bottom-up and top-down elements. The PRIMES model covers the 27 EU Member States as well as candidate and neighbour states (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, South East Europe). The timeframe of the model is 2000 to 2050 by five-year periods; the years up to 2005 are calibrated to Eurostat data. The level of detail of the model is large as it contains:

- 12 industrial sectors, subdivided into 26 sub-sectors using energy in 12 generic processes (e.g. air compression, furnaces)
- 5 tertiary sectors, using energy in 6 processes (e.g. air conditioning, office equipment)
- 4 dwelling types using energy in 5 processes (e.g. water heating, cooking) and 12 types of electrical durable goods (e.g. refrigerator, washing machine, television)
- 4 transport modes, 10 transport means (e.g. cars, buses, motorcycles, trucks, airplanes) and 10 vehicle technologies (e.g. internal combustion engine, hybrid cars)
- 14 fossil fuel types, new fuel carriers (hydrogen, biofuels) 10 renewable energy types
- Main Supply System: power and steam generation with 150 power and steam technologies and 240 grid interconnections
- Other sub-systems: refineries, gas supply, biomass supply, hydrogen supply, primary energy production
- 7 types of emissions from energy processing (e.g. SO₂, NO_x, PM)
- CO₂ emissions from industrial processes
- GHG emissions and abatement (using IIASA's marginal abatement cost curves for non CO₂ GHGs).

For further information see

http://www.e3mlab.ntua.gr/e3mlab/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58%3Amanual-for-primes-model&catid=35%3Aprimes&Itemid=80&lang=en

Prometheus model

A fully stochastic World energy model used for assessing uncertainties and risks associated with the main energy aggregates including uncertainties associated with economic growth and resource endowment as well as the impact of policy actions (R&D on specific technologies, taxes, standards, subsidies and other supports). The model projects endogenously to the future the world energy prices, supply, demand and emissions for 10 World regions. World fossil fuel price trajectories are used for the EU modelling as import price assumptions for PRIMES.

Annex 2 - Energy Roadmap 2050 – Selected Stakeholders' Scenarios

- 1. INTRODUCTION**
- 2. SCANNING OF STAKEHOLDER SCENARIOS**
- 3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO STUDIES**
 - 3.1 Policy Assumptions and Targets
 - 3.2 Economic Assumptions
 - 3.3 Assumptions on Social Issues
 - 3.4 Further Technology Assumptions
 - 3.5 Key Results of Scenarios
 - 3.6 Models Used and Interdependencies Between Studies

- 4. SUMMARY OF COMPARISON**

References

1. INTRODUCTION

Stakeholders are continuing their work on scenarios for long term transformation of energy systems. These analyses, using a variety of models and assumptions and exploring a variety of constraints, all help in assessing the **robustness of conclusions** on policy actions needed in the coming years.

The bulk of this report, chapters 2-4, is a systematic presentation of a representative sample of European long term energy scenarios. Their policy targets, assumptions on various economic, social and technological factors, and resulting outcomes of model-based analyses are compared. The purpose is not to judge the outcomes of the scenarios but to try to understand and clearly describe the similarities and differences in the scenarios²⁰. This work was completed in April 2011.

Since then, several scenarios this year explore consequences of the Fukushima accident and unconventional gas. In the **IEA**²¹'s global scenario to 2035 entitled The Golden Age of Gas, ample availability of gas, much of it unconventional, keeps average gas prices well below levels assumed in WEO-2010. Especially in growing economies in China and other non-OECD countries, gas consumption increases throughout the energy system, driven by price, improved access to supplies, efficiency improvements in technologies, also emissions benefits. Its flexibility is a distinct benefit in a perspective of much change in energy systems and much uncertainty about how drivers will play out. In Europe, scenario analyses by the **European Gas Advocacy Forum**²² and **Eurogas**²³ underline this flexibility and how it can be used. EGAF argues that with greater use of gas in the short to medium term, to 2030 or so, implementation risks in the early years of a long-term strategy focused on renewables²⁴ can be reduced as well as overall costs. Eurogas similarly argues that the balance which will emerge between renewables and CCS/fossil fuels cannot be known today and that investing in gas keeps these long-term options open. The importance of **CCS** in these strategies in the long term is evident in the IEA scenario which does not assume availability of CCS by 2035. In this scenario, the long-term trajectory for CO2 emissions is towards 650ppm, thus a probable temperature rise well above the 2 degrees C target.

The European Climate Foundation in this year's phase of its Roadmap 2050 work, concentrates on trade-offs in the **period till 2030**, exploring coherent policy actions needed to keep the European energy system on track to 2050. With further analyses of its 60% renewables and high renewables scenarios for the power sector²⁵, trade-offs among additional grid infrastructures, generation capacities and their location, storage and demand side management are examined. Additional grid investments beyond 2020, although substantial, are low compared to generation investments. If these grid investments are not made, the result

²⁰ Key references for this work are: (1) "Analysis and Comparison of Relevant Mid- and Long-term Energy Scenarios for EU and their Key Underlying Assumptions" (PROGNOS, 2011) [8], and (2) "Key Factors Affecting the Deployment of Electricity Generation Technologies in Energy Technology Scenarios" (Paul Scherrer Institut, 2009) [9].

²¹ World Energy Outlook 2011 - special early insights: "Are We Entering A Golden Age Of Gas?" International Energy Agency, June 2011 (complete WEO 2011 due 9 November)

²² "Making the Green Journey Work", European Gas Advocacy Forum, February 2011

²³ Eurogas Roadmap 2050, 13 October 2011

²⁴ EGAF refers to European Climate Foundation's 60% RES scenario for the power sector (Roadmap 2050, 2010)

²⁵ "Power Perspectives 2030", European Climate Foundation, 7 November 2011; scenarios from Roadmap 2050, ECF, 2010.

is an increase in back-up and operational costs amounting to far more than the grid investments saved. Demand response, within day, reduces the need for additional transmission infrastructure. The deployment of renewables in order of productiveness across Europe reduces cumulative generation capital costs by over a fifth by 2030 compared to a Member State by Member State approach. ECF also examines price setting in regional markets and utilisation rates of additional back-up plant, crucial for understanding market design issues.

Greenpeace concentrated on grids in its 2011 scenario analyses²⁶, building on its earlier Renewables 24/7 study. Looking beyond 2030, a High Grid scenario encompassing much trade and North African solar resources and a Low Grid scenario with more local solutions within Europe are explored. With adequate transmission, both would imply shrinking utilisation rates for coal and nuclear plants and later for gas fired plants, which could then be converted to biogas.

Scenarios for sustained transformation of the energy system are now being developed by a **whole range of organisations**, at local, Member State and European level²⁷. Many look explicitly at the European market and policy context²⁸.

The conclusions of these scenario analyses and the **analyses by the Commission** are consistent on many but not all issues. All agree on the importance of **energy efficiency** in any strategy. The increased reliance on **capital investments** in the transformation of the energy system and in energy efficiency improvements is evident in all scenarios, raising financing, risk management and cost of capital issues to the top of the agenda. All see a much stronger reliance on **renewables** than currently, which raises issues notably for the power system. **Flexibility** from all sources is increasingly important. **Grid investments** and the market developments that go with them look like a no-regrets policy, at least in the period to 2030. Areas of difference among scenarios often concern **timing**. They include the degree of **early reliance on electrification** as opposed to direct use of, notably, gas, in heating, transport and industry. Estimates of **total system costs** in scenarios are still very different. They are not easy to compare.

2. SCANNING OF STAKEHOLDER SCENARIOS

A variety of international organisations, industry associations, individual companies, NGOs and research/academic institutions have put forward mid- and long-term energy scenarios. In order to make a representative sample, 28 studies were identified by screening contributions and publications from stakeholders.

A representative set of 7 studies was selected (see [Table 1](#)). The criteria used were time horizon until at least 2030, geographical coverage of EU-27 (or Europe²⁹), public availability of main results in a quantitative form, coverage of at least the electricity sector, level of detail, and the scenarios being well known and discussed internationally. For example, studies covering only the world as a whole without defining Europe as a region were not selected. The time horizon, geographical and sectorial coverages, as well as the level of detail, vary greatly among the scanned studies.

²⁶ "Battle of the Grids", Greenpeace supported by Energynautics, 2011

²⁷ For example, members of European Environment and Sustainable Development Advisory Councils

²⁸ Eg. DIW work for review of German energy concept

²⁹ "Europe" is sometimes defined as OECD-Europe, EU-25 (for older scenario studies) or EU-27.

Table 1: Scanning of Energy Scenario Studies

Nr.		Year of publication	Time horizon	Amount of scenarios (sensitivities)	Geographical coverage			Coverage of the sectors						Type of model	Bottom-up	Top-down	None	Short list for selection
					World	Europe	EU-27	Quantifiability	Residential	Commercial / Services	Industrial	Transportation	Power	Other conversion sectors				
<u>Governmental institutions:</u>																		
1	US-DOE EIA (2010). International Energy Outlook 2010	2010	2035	1 (+4)	x	(OECD)	(EU-19)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	6	+++	x	
2	European Parliament (2009). Future Energy Systems in Europe	2009	2030	3		x		x	x	x	x	x		x	3	+	x	
3	EU DG TREN/ENER (2008, 2010, 2011) - "EC Reference Scenario to 2050"	2008 / 2010	2030	1 resp. 2		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	6	+++	x	x
4	EU DG Research (2006). World Energy Technology Outlook. WETO - H2	2006	2050	3	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	++	x	
5	EU DG TREN (2006). Scenarios on energy efficiency and renewables	2006	2030	3 (+2)			(EU-25)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	6	++	x	
<u>Inter-governmental institutions and Non-governmental organisations:</u>																		
6	ECF (2010). Roadmap 2050	2010	2050	3 (+1)			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	?	6	+++	x	x
7	EREC (2010). RE-Thinking 2050	2010	2050	1 (+1)			x	x	x (Renewable heat)	x (RES-E)		x	x	x	2	+	x	(x)
8	Greenpeace/EREC (2010). Energy [r]evolution	2010	2050	3	x	(OECD)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	+++	x	x
9	IEA (2010). Energy Technology Perspectives	2010	2050	2 (+4)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	5	+++	x	x
10	IEA/NEA (2010). Technology Roadmap; Nuclear Energy	2010	2050	3				Based on IEA (2010)							0	+		
11	IAEA (2009). Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for Period up to 2030	2009	2030	2	x	x		x							0	+		
12	IEA (2009). World Energy Outlook 2009	2009	2030	2	x	(OECD)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	5	+++	x	x
13	NEA (2008). Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008	2008	2050	2	x	(OECD)		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	+		x
14	WEC (2007). Deciding the Future: Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050	2007	2050	4			(x)								0	+		
15	EEA (2005). European Environment Outlook	2005	2030	2	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	5	+	x	
<u>Industry:</u>																		
16	ExxonMobil (2009). Outlook for Energy; A View to 2030	2009	2030	1	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	+	x (?)	
17	IHS Global Insight (2008). European Energy and Environmental Outlook	2008	2030	1		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	6	++	x (?)	
18	Shell (2008). Shell energy scenarios to 2050	2008	2050	2	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	+	x (?)	
19	PWC (2006). The World in 2050	2006	2050	6	x			x							0	+	x (?)	
<u>Industry associations:</u>																		
20	Eurelectric (2009). Power Choices	2009	2050	1 (+ base)			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	5	++	x	x
21	Euracoal (2007). The future role of coal in Europe	2007	2030	5	x	x	x	x					x	x	1	++	x	
22	Eurelectric (2007). The Role of Electricity	2007	2030/2050	4			(EU-25)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	5	+	x	
<u>Research / academic consortia:</u>																		
23	FEEM et al.(2010). Probabilistic long-term assessm.of new energy technol.scenarios	2010	2050	10	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	6	+++	x	x
24	Capros et al. (2008). Model-based Analysis of the 2008 EU Policy Package	2008	2030	9		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	6	++	x	
25	Energy Watch Group (2008). Renewable Energy Outlook 2030	2008	2030	2	x	(OECD)		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4	++	x	
26	Öko-Institut (2006, update 2011). The Vision Scenario for the European Union	2006	2030	2			(EU-25)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	6	+	x	
27	ECN (2005). The next 50 years: Four European energy futures	2005	2050	4	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	+		x
28	ISIS et al. (2005-9). NEEDS - New Energy Externalities Development for Sustainability	2009	2050	7	x			x							+			

The **7 studies selected to be compared in detail** are, as follows (see full references at the end of this report):

- **European Commission Reference Scenario to 2050**, published in 2011, [1]:
 - "The 2050 Reference scenario depicts energy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission developments on the basis of policies implemented up to March 2010, mirroring as well the achievement of the legally binding 2020 targets on renewables (RES) and GHG and the implementation of the ETS Directive. It shows the magnitude of the additional effort needed for EU policies to achieve the European Council's GHG mitigation objective."
- **European Climate Foundation (ECF) – Roadmap 2050**, 2010, [2]:
 - "The objectives of the Roadmap 2050 are: a) to investigate the technical and economic feasibility of achieving at least an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2050, while maintaining or improving today's levels of electricity supply reliability, energy security, economic growth and prosperity; and b) to derive the implications for the European energy system over the next 5 to 10 years."
- **Greenpeace/EREC – Energy [R]evolution (+EREC (2010), Re-thinking 2050)**, 2010, [3]:
 - "The report demonstrates how the world can get from where we are now, to where we need to be in terms of phasing out fossil fuels, cutting CO2 while ensuring energy security. This includes illustrating how the world's carbon emissions from the energy and transport sectors alone can peak by 2015 and be cut by over 80% by 2050."
- **International Energy Agency (IEA) – Energy Technologies Perspectives (ETP)**, 2010, [4]:
 - "The goal of the analysis in this book is to provide an IEA perspective on the potential for energy technologies to contribute to deep emission reduction targets and the associated costs and benefits. It uses a techno-economic approach to identify the role of both current and new technologies in reducing CO2 emissions and improving energy security."
- **IEA – World Energy Outlook (WEO)**, 2009, [5]:
 - "The results of the analysis presented here aim to provide policy makers, investors and energy consumers alike with a rigorous, quantitative framework for assessing likely future trends in energy markets and the cost-effectiveness of new policies to tackle climate change, energy insecurity and other pressing energy-related policy challenges." (Reference scenario);
 - "More specifically, this report is intended to inform the climate negotiations by providing an analytical basis for the adoption and implementation of commitments and plans to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions." (450 Scenario).
- **Eurelectric – Power Choices**, 2009, [6]:
 - "The Eurelectric Power Choices study was set up to examine how the vision, of cutting Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 75% in 2050, can be made reality. Power Choices looks into the technological developments that will be needed in the coming decades and examines some of the policy options that will have to be put in place within the EU to attain a deep cut in carbon emissions by mid-century."
- **FEEM³⁰ et al., EU-RTD Project PLANETS: Probabilistic Long-term Assessment of New Energy Technology Scenarios**, 2010, [7]:
 - "PLANETS is a research project funded by the EC under the 7th Framework Programme with the scope of devising robust scenarios for the evolution of energy technologies in the next 50 years. The project aims to assess the impact of technology development and deployment at world and European levels, by means of an ensemble of analytical tools designed to foresee the best technological hedging policy in response to future environmental and energy policies."

³⁰ Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).

3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO STUDIES

3.1 Policy Assumptions and Targets

All scenario studies analysed use a "*baseline scenario*" to show the impact of presently implemented policies (e.g. until 2009). These baseline scenarios are used as a basis for assessing impacts of alternative scenarios.

The "*alternative scenarios*" all aim at reducing GHG or CO₂ emissions (and are generally in line with the EU 2020 target of -20% and to the long term target of -80% to -95% by 2050).

Most models concentrate on the electricity sector and are much less detailed (or provide no details) on developments in the heating and transport sectors (except insofar as they may assume major electrification in these sectors).

Table 2 gives an overview of main pre-defined policy assumptions and targets across the scenarios (for EU-27 or OECD-Europe, depending on study) for:

- GHG or CO₂ emissions reduction (economy-wide),
- Share of renewables (RES),
- Role of nuclear,
- Efficiency,
- Emission Trading System (ETS) and remarks on status of policies taken into account.

Table 2: Overview of Main Policy Assumptions and Pre-Defined Targets in the Scenarios

Short name scenario	GHG or CO ₂ -emissions reduction, economy-wide	Share of renewables in gross final energy consumption	Share of nuclear in power generation	Reduction in primary energy by improved energy efficiency	Carbon policy
WEO Ref	■ GHG: -20% below 1990 levels by 2020 for EU	■ 20% by 2020 for EU	■	■ 20% by 2020 for EU	■ Policies until mid-2009 ■ ETS
WEO 450 ppm	■ GHG: -20% below 1990 levels by 2020 and -80% by 2050	■ 20% by 2020	■	■ 20% by 2020	■ Policies until mid-2009 ■ ETS (OECD+, OME)
ETP BL OECD Europe	■ GHG: -20% below 1990 levels by 2020 for EU	■ 20% by 2020 for EU	■	■ 20% by 2020 for EU	■ Policies until mid-2009 ■ ETS
ETP Blue Map OECD Europe	■ CO2eq: -74% below 2007 levels by 2050 ■ GHG: -20% below 1990 levels by 2020 for EU	■ 20% by 2020 for EU	■	■ 20% by 2020 for EU	■ Policies until mid-2009 ■ ETS (OECD+, OME)
EC Reference Scenario to 2050	■ GHG: -20% below 1990 levels by 2020 (in the Reference scenario)	■ 20% by 2020 (in the Reference scenario)	■ Economic modelling with currently non nuclear MS remaining non nuclear except Poland and Italy;	■	■ Implemented Policies until March 2010 & achievement of legally binding

			phase-out in 2 MS		targets
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Revised ETS Directive applied until 2050
ECF BL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GHG: -20% below 1990 levels by 2020 for EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20% by 2020 for EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20% by 2020 for EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Policies until mid-2009 ▪ ETS
ECF 80% RES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GHG: -80% below 1990 levels by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 80% RES of power generation by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10% nuclear of power generation by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20% by 2020 for EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ETS (OECD+OME)
ECF 60% RES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GHG: -80% below 1990 levels by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 60% RES of power generation by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20% nuclear of power generation by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20% by 2020 for EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ETS (OECD+OME)
ECF 40% RES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GHG: -80% below 1990 levels by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 40% RES of power generation by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 30% nuclear of power generation by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20% by 2020 for EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ETS (OECD+OME)
E[R] Ref	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No specific targets or policies mentioned
E[R]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CO2: -80% below 1990 levels by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Phasing out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No specific targets or policies mentioned
E[R] Adv	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CO2: -95% below 1990 levels by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ High RES share: "Close to fully renewable energy system" by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Phasing out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No specific targets or policies mentioned
Eurelectric BL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Germany and Belgium phased out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Policies until mid-2009 ▪ ETS
Eurelectric Power Choices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GHG: -40% below 1990 levels by 2030 and -75% by 2050 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20% by 2020 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Germany and Belgium phased out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20% by 2020 for EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Policies until mid-2009 ▪ ETS (all sectors)
FEEM-WITCH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No exogenous constraint 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪

Abbreviations used: ETS: Emissions Trading System, GHG: Greenhouse Gas, OME: Other Major Economies (Brazil, Russia, South Africa and the countries of the Middle East), MS: EU Member States.

From Table 2 it can be seen that:

In relation to reduction of GHG emissions,

- Most of the studies do not take into account negative or positive effects of climate change on the economy in the models used. One exception found are the FEEM-scenarios where the WITCH-model incorporates an integrated assessment module which is able to take into account a dynamic linkage of climate change and economic activity.
- In general, some form of European Emissions Trading (ETS) is considered in most studies (exceptions are Greenpeace/EREC and FEEM), some models used for scenarios development even have specific modules which simulate a market for emission allowances³¹ (e.g. PRIMES used by both Commission services and Eurelectric).
- The scenarios differ in their assumptions about future emissions trading markets. There is a large consensus about the sectors included, but not about the geographical coverage. Some studies assume no extension of the current EU emissions trading, others assume an expansion of the market from OECD+ up to a global dimension. With the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), another possibility to enlarge the geographic coverage of the allowances market exists. The EU DG ENER scenarios focus on this issue, other scenarios give little information. Finally, some scenarios envisage small deviations from the current status of the allocation process, assuming full auctioning in the power sector and grandfathering in the other sectors. Other scenarios tend towards a general full auctioning of allowances.

Carbon pricing in the different scenarios is shown in Table 3:

Table 3: Comparison of Carbon Pricing in the Scenarios

Scenario	Sectoral coverage	Geographical coverage	Auctioning or grandfathering	CDM
IEA – WEO	Existing EU-ETS, including aviation	n/a	n/a	CDM taken into account
IEA – WEO 450 ppm	n/a	OECD+ in 2013, major economies as of 2021	n/a	CDM taken into account
IEA – ETP Reference	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
IEA – ETP Blueline	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
EU DG ENER Reference	Existing EU-ETS including aviation	n/a	Auctioning in power sector, grandfathering for other-sectors	CDM taken into account
EU DG ENER Baseline	n/a	n/a	Auctioning in power sector, grandfathering for other-sectors	Limited use of CDM-credits
ECF Roadmap Reference	Industry, power sector, aviation	n/a	n/a	n/a
ECF Roadmap Pathways	Industry, power sector, aviation	Until 2020 OECD-countries, from 2020 including developing countries	n/a	n/a

³¹ ETS is explicitly modelled by the Commission services' scenarios that derive ETS prices endogenously.

Energy [R]evolution	n/a	Global CO ₂ trading system in the long term	n/a	n/a
Energy [R]evolution Advanced	n/a	Global CO ₂ trading system in the long term	All allowances should be auctioned	n/a
Eurelectric Baseline	n/a	n/a	Full auctioning as of 2015 (except some new Member States)	n/a
Eurelectric Power Choices	ETS extended to all major economic sectors after 2020	International carbon market after 2020	Full auctioning as of 2015 (except some new Member States)	n/a
FEEM et al. - Planets	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

In relation to future energy mixes,

- A few studies use pre-defined future energy mix targets, by preferring or excluding certain technologies from the beginning (in a "back-casting approach"):
- Predetermined Role of Renewables (RES): Only Greenpeace/EREC and ECF make specifications on the desired shares of RES energies in 2050:
 - Greenpeace/EREC sets in its advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario the 2050 RES target share at 100% (all sectors).
 - ECF sets in its alternative scenarios the 2050 power sector RES target share at 40%, 60% and 80%, respectively.
- Predetermined Role of Nuclear Energy (NUC) and Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS): Greenpeace/EREC and ECF specify pre-defined shares of NUC and CCS in 2050:
 - Greenpeace/EREC sets in its advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario the 2050 NUC as well as CCS target shares to 0%.
 - ECF focuses on the RES share. For the purposes of the analysis, particularly of infrastructure needs, it divides the remaining share equally between NUC and CCS, thus 30%, 20% and 10% for each, in the three alternative scenarios³².

The other scenarios determine the contribution of NUC and CCS on the basis of cost assumptions and optimisation rather than pre-defined policy targets.

In relation to sustainability aspects other than GHG reduction,

Economic constraints or the issue of maintaining high levels of grid stability and overall system reliability are in most cases either not considered or at least not fully quantified:

- Economic constraints, e.g.:
 - Minimisation of private financial costs (investment in new generation capacities and infrastructure (an exception is e.g. ECF)),
 - Minimisation of social costs, such as environmental externalities (costs of GHG avoided, other environmental pollution, land use, etc.)³³.

Maintaining high levels of grid stability and overall system reliability³⁴, e.g.:

³² and 20% Demand-Side Management (DSM) by 2050 in the ECF study.

³³ In scenarios mirroring cost-effective achievement of GHG reduction, PRIMES scenarios make sure that marginal costs are equal across sectors and MS.

³⁴ In a study published by KEMA and Imperial College London in 2010 and performed for ECF, these issues went at least partly into the modelling.

The high relevance of this issue is due to the fact that scenarios with high shares of RES energy sources, particularly wind and solar energy, increase the need for backup capacity or other means of ensuring grid stability. Substitution of electricity for FOS fuels in buildings and transportation, results in higher electricity demand but also expanded possibilities for demand management. These challenges are addressed by all of the studies in one way or another. Several approaches can be identified in the scenarios:

- Flexible thermal power plants (NUC, FOS) for load-following operation and back-up capacity,
- Greater use of non variable RES energy (biomass, solar with storage, geothermal, hydro with pumped storage facilities),
- Transmission expansion. This approach is constrained in some of the scenarios by model limitations. In PRIMES, interconnections are exogenous. The model used in ECF's scenarios derives transmission needs,
- Large-scale storage
- Smart grids and demand side management developments.

Maintaining high levels of system reliability and thus high levels of power supply security is qualitatively mentioned across most studies as a key objective and in some studies also as a key challenge.

Regarding realisation, particularly studies with ambitious GHG reduction targets implicitly assume significant progress in grid technology (ECF maintains that they use existing technologies) and social acceptance related to transmission expansion to be able to achieve their targets. However, analysis is typically not taken further³⁵ from such largely qualitative statements and it is usually concluded that financing needs to be found for the large increases in pan-European transmission and storage capacities to be able to cope with the expected large future shares of intermittent generation.

Implications for distribution networks are not addressed by most of the studies. This is particularly concerning as almost all studies emphasize at the same time the relevance of technologically advanced smart grids and smart metering, especially those confronted with ambitious emission reductions (Energy [R]evolution, ECF Pathways, ETP Blueline, Eurelectric Power Choices).

In relation to security of supply of energy resources,

- All scenarios expect reserves of natural gas to be sufficient to meet future demands. Unconventional oil reserves are expected to be deployed in some scenarios without ambitious emission reductions (e.g. ETP Reference). No indicators of security of supply are developed. Possible indicators (diversity of imports, stability of exports, reliability of supply, diversity of supply, etc.) are not developed.

3.2 Economic Assumptions

Regarding general economic assumptions,


- The scenarios assume a steady increase of GDP of ~1-2% per year until 2030/2050. The recent financial crisis is taken into account in the projections of GDP.

³⁵ Only one study was identified containing specific data in this field (ECF/KEMA).

Regarding fossil fuel prices,

- Fossil fuel prices are often exogenously determined (in PRIMES scenarios by using a separate modelling framework). ECF and Greenpeace/EREC use price developments from WEO 2009. In WEO 2009, international fossil fuel prices are based on a top-down assessment of prices which would create enough investment to meet energy demand over the projection period (global balance of supply and demand). Therefore, fossil fuel prices in WEO are endogenously determined and sensitive to scenario assumptions. ETP takes prices up to 2030 from WEO 2009 and calculates prices for the period beyond 2030 by taking into account the long-term oil supply cost curve.
- Recent studies suggest a range of ~90-120 USD/barrel until 2030 and 2050 for the oil price. Only Greenpeace/EREC considers an oil price that increases to 150 USD/barrel in 2030. Oil prices in Greenpeace/EREC and ECF are assumed to stay constant after 2030.
- Until 2030 most scenarios presume an increasing gas price. In the IEA alternative scenarios the prices of gas, as for oil, stabilise or decrease after 2030 due to weaker energy demand, while in the reference case gas prices increase in respond to increasing demand (e.g. from additional gas-fired power plants).
- Most studies agree on the idea that gas prices will keep their linkage with oil prices, i.e. the ratio of gas and oil prices remains quite constant³⁶. Main exceptions are the Greenpeace/EREC Energy [R]evolution and – to some extent – the alternative scenario of the PLANETS-WITCH project (see Figure 1). The PLANETS alternative scenario assumes a higher increase of gas prices than oil prices, motivated by the high gas demand and relatively low oil demand.

Figure 1: Development of Gas to Oil Prices, in %



³⁶ WEO expects US gas prices to be partly disconnected from oil prices, due to large indigenous gas reserves.

- A moderate increase of coal prices is assumed in most of the scenarios. Some differences exist in expectations of future gas-to-coal price ratios. Most of the studies (e.g. Eurelectric) expect coal prices to increase at far lower rates than gas prices. A slight decoupling can be observed in most of the scenario studies. In contrast to the other studies, the Energy [R]evolution of Greenpeace/EREC and the alternative scenario of the PLANETS-WITCH project show a stronger increase of coal than oil prices in the long run.


Regarding incentives for RES,

- Some studies (e.g. Eurelectric Power Choices) explicitly assume decreasing direct incentives for RES in the future due to assumed increasing cost-competitiveness.

Regarding CO2-certificate prices,

- Different developments for the (typically assumed) CO2-certificate prices are to some part also determined by targets set and the resulting CO2-emissions development. As shown in Figure 2, emissions in the ECF Pathways and the WEO 450 ppm show a faster decline than emissions in the Eurelectric Power Choices scenario, which seems to allow a higher degree of flexibility to reach the targets set for 2050. Furthermore, the sharp increase of CO2-certificate prices in the Eurelectric Power Choices scenario from 2030 onwards partly results from the assumed removal of mandatory RES-targets after 2020. Therefore, carbon prices gain high importance to deliver required emission reductions by 2050.

Figure 2: Development of CO2-certificate prices, in EUR_{2008/t CO2}



On the other hand, assumed geographical extension of emission trading systems (e.g. in the ECF Pathways, WEO 450 ppm and the Power Choices scenario international carbon markets are assumed not later than 2020) can be interpreted to prevent carbon prices from rising unlimited. This effect is due to more abundant and cheap opportunities for emission reduction outside the EU/OECD.

Relatively low prices for emission certificates in the Greenpeace/EREC study may be partly determined by the idea that the process of emission trading remains unclear and is not able to help RES energy expansion (and is thus not considered adequate to become an important parameter for Greenpeace/EREC in their model).

In summary, the pre-defined importance of carbon prices as an instrument in different scenario studies may also explain their different resulting price levels (e.g. in the Power Choices scenario, carbon prices are assumed to be important to reach emission targets).

Regarding investment costs,

- All scenarios confronted with high emission reduction requirements estimate a considerable increase in capital expenditure. Even baseline scenarios suggest an increase in capital expenditure in the coming years. The somewhat higher estimation in the emissions reduction scenarios is generally based on several effects: higher capital intensity of RES technologies in terms of costs per power produced and the need for higher power transmission capacity due to intermittency of most of the expected new RES (investment in power transmission capacity is roughly estimated to be 20-50 % higher in most of the alternative scenarios, compared to Baseline or Reference scenarios); higher capital intensity of new NUC and CCS investments. The scenarios also agree in the estimation of lower expenses for FOS fuels in due course due to large substitutions of RES for FOS fuels and energy efficiency improvements.
- Overall, these effects lead to somewhat different total cost results across scenarios with large methodological uncertainties, strongly influenced by different modelling mechanisms (e.g. cost-optimization vs. accounting frameworks), framework parameters (e.g. price developments; see above) and conventions for cost-estimations. Furthermore, results are often not available for the same timeframes and geographical boundaries.
- Results on future investment costs are also strongly influenced by the chosen assumptions on technological developments in energy transformation and end-user applications. A lot depends on learning rates. For example, in ECF, learning rates are 5% for wind offshore/onshore, 15% for solar PV and 12% for CCS and yearly reductions in investments costs per capacity are estimated at 1% for biomass and geothermal plants, compared to 0,5% for FOS-fired plants.
- Table 4 shows compliance costs available in alternative scenarios, differentiated into total costs and grid costs or investment:

Table 4: Comparison of Compliance and Grid Costs/Investment in Alternative Scenarios

Scenario	Estimated compliance costs/investment	Estimated grid costs/investment	Comments
IEA – WEO 450 ppm	▪ EU-27: +1600 bn USD (vs. Ref.) cumulative investment in the energy sector (incl. grid costs) till 2035	▪ Global: 5100 bn USD (20% lower vs. Ref.) cumulative investment till 2035	▪ External costs not included (except GHG) ▪ Grid investment (Ref.): 25% transmission, 75% distribution
IEA – ETP Blue Map	▪ EU-27: additional cumulative investment (energy sector) compensated by cumulative fuel savings: 7100 bn USD vs. 13100 bn USD till 2050 (vs. Bas.)	▪ Global: 12300 bn USD (incl. smart grids) cumulative grid-investment till 2050 (+50% vs. Bas.)	▪ Grid investment (Ref.): 30% transmission, 70% distribution ▪ Back-up costs may be considered implicitly
EU DG ENER Ref.	▪ ~175 bn €p.a. (2030) capital and O&M costs in power generation (i.e. 51,0 €MWh)	▪ EU-27: grid costs of 10,8 €MWh (2030) vs. 7,4 (2010), i.e. ~165 bn €cumulative grid costs	▪ Distribution grid not included ▪ Back-up costs

			considered implicitly
▪ ECF Roadmap 80% RES	▪ Lower fuel costs dominate capital cost expenses: overall -80 bn € in 2020 (-205 bn € in 2030) vs. Ref.	▪ Cumulative additional transmission capex: 95-129 bn € additional back-up capex: 63-99 bn €(vs. Ref.) ▪ Cumulative additional distribution capex: 200-300 bn €	▪ Amount by which distribution costs are incremental to the Ref. is unclear
Energy [R]evolution Advanced	▪ Global: 292 bn USD add. investment p.a. 2007-2030 (vs. Ref.) ▪ 42 bn € additional investment p.a., fuel savings of 62 bn € p.a. (2007-2050, vs. Ref.)	▪ Costs of 209 bn € p.a. for the assumed new European "Supergrid"	▪ Grid costs estimated externally, cost structure of grid costs not further specified
Eurelectric Power Choices	▪ Capital and O&M costs of 53,3 €MWh in 2030	▪ Grid-costs rise from 7,3 to 12,6 €MWh (2050) ▪ Cumulative grid investment: 1.500 bn €(+35% vs. Baseline)	▪ No external costs besides CO2-costs ▪ Not clear if back-up costs are considered implicitly
FEEM et al. - Planets	▪ Global: ~800 (2030) and 2500 (2050) bn € yearly costs (i.e. 1-2,5 % of GDP)	▪ n/a	▪ Costs are measured as consumption losses vs. the Reference scenario

- Table 4 shows that:
 - A comparison of total cost results from the different scenario studies is hardly possible as the underlying assumptions on methods and data used are in most cases not presented sufficiently transparently to give a clear picture on the dependability of figures presented (see also above discussion about grid costs).
 - Macroeconomic costs or benefits are not provided, so the net economic cost or benefit (e.g. including the gains or losses from competitiveness factors) are not available.
 - Distribution costs are hardly ever estimated although they seem to represent the majority of necessary grid investments. This makes it doubtful that costs for infrastructure changes are realistically included in most scenarios.

Regarding electricity prices,

- Electricity prices increase in most of the studies at least in the medium term (up to 2030). Some studies with high emission reduction targets expect a decrease of electricity prices in the long term (up to 2050), mainly driven by lower consumption of FOS fuels in the power sector in combination with assumed technological improvements for RES power plants. Not all studies actually calculate electricity prices for a market environment with supply of and demand for electricity. Therefore Table 5, providing an overview on electricity prices and their main drivers, displays electricity generation costs as a proxy for electricity prices in these cases.

Table 5: Comparison of Properties of Electricity Prices in the Different Scenarios

Study and scenario	Electricity price/cost developments	Main drivers
IEA – WEO Ref and 450 ppm	▪ No data for Europe	▪ No data for Europe
IEA – ETP Ref and Blue Map	▪ No data for Europe	▪ No data for Europe
EU DG ENER Reference	▪ 1.4% average annual rise 2000-2030, declining after 2025	▪ Increasing fuel prices, higher capital costs of RES, NUC and CCS, auctioning of CO2-allowances
EU DG ENER Baseline	▪ 1.5% average annual rise 2000-2030, declining after 2025	▪ Increasing fuel prices, higher capital costs of RES, NUC and CCS, auctioning of CO2-allowances
ECF Roadmap Reference	▪ n/a	▪ Carbon prices, fossil-fuel prices, technology learning rates
ECF Roadmap Pathways	▪ Higher levelised costs of electricity (LCOE) than in the Ref. (short term), slightly higher LCOE by 2050	▪ Carbon prices, fossil-fuel prices, technology learning rates
Energy [R]evolution	▪ Generation costs increase up to 2020, upward tendency until 2050	▪ Fossil fuel prices, technology improvements of RES-technologies, costs for CO2-allowances
Energy [R]evolution Advanced	▪ Generation costs increase up to 2030 and decrease afterwards (-34-43 % 2050 compared to the Baseline)	▪ Fossil fuel prices, technology improvements of RES-technologies, costs for CO2-allowances
Eurelectric Baseline	▪ Strong increase up to 2025, stabilization afterwards	▪ Fossil fuel prices, restructuring of the power plant fleet
Eurelectric Power Choices	▪ Strong increase up to 2025, slight decrease afterwards	▪ Fossil fuel prices, restructuring of the power plant fleet, lower fossil fuel consumption and lower demand for CO2-allowances)
FEEM et al. – Planets	▪ Electricity prices stay almost constant	▪ Restructuring of power generation
FEEM et al. – Planets Fb 3.2	▪ Increase until 2015, stagnation 2015 to 2035, sharp increase after 2035	▪ Restructuring of power generation, increasing electricity demand

Key points:

- The economic performances of all energy technologies – FOS, NUC and RES – are reflected by their specific generation costs which are heavily influenced by assumed future fuel and carbon prices, and assumed technology learning rates.
- Technology-neutral studies, such as from IEA, DG ENER or Eurelectric, give high importance to the carbon price as a key driver to deploy the most competitive low-carbon technologies and leave it then to the market to develop the future energy mix.
- Comparison of total costs for developing a more sustainable EU energy system by 2050 is hardly possible due to lack of transparency in most scenarios on methodological and data assumptions.
- Most scenarios seem to lack a realistic consideration of the costs for necessary infrastructure changes. For example, although investments in the distribution grid represents the majority of necessary grid investments, in almost all scenarios only transmission costs (if at all) are considered.
- Electricity prices increase in most of the studies at least in the medium term (2030).

3.3 Assumptions on Social Issues

The most important effect in the EU social structure considered in the scenarios is change in size of population. Throughout the studies, a slight increase of the EU population is expected in the medium term (immigration), with the tendency to a stabilised population in the long term. Some studies also assume a significant decrease in the size of households.

However, in none of the scenarios analyzed evidence on fundamental changes in the behavioural patterns of the economic agents was found.

Some studies (e.g. PRIMES-based Eurelectric, DG TREN, FEEM) apply fixed microeconomic decisions of economic agents concerning demand for energy related products and investment in energy supply equipment. These scenarios partly take into account different levels of risk-awareness of agents (higher levels for individuals than for enterprises, reflected by high discount rates for individuals), lack of information, market barriers for new technologies and rebound-effects in energy-efficiency investments. Investment decisions are modelled under full information and perfect foresight assumptions.

Only very little information concerning trends and effects on the labour market was found in the studies. However, in some scenarios (ECF pathways, Energy [R]evolution) sectorial shifts on the labour market from traditional energy sectors (e.g. FOS fuels) to sectors linked to RES installations are expected. Magnitudes of these effects are very differently estimated, usually ignoring the related loss of employment and market leadership in more traditional sectors.

The risk of loss of global competitiveness of energy intensive industries and related deindustrialisation in Europe is usually not considered explicitly.

Issues of public acceptance regarding deployment of new power plants (large-scale RES, new NUC, low-carbon FOS), new RES-support infrastructure (pan-European grid, large storage) or new enforced consumer behaviour (smart metering) are nowhere explicitly modelled (implicitly only for NUC by assuming e.g. growth rates being much more limited than economic optimisation would suggest).

Key points:

- Only few studies explicitly model changes in the behaviour of economic agents with regard to changes in consumer behaviour or public acceptance of deployment of new power generation plants and RES-support infrastructures,
- Effects on the EU labour market and the economy as a whole (e.g. risk of deindustrialisation) as a consequence of visions of a future EU energy mix are not consistently modelled in any scenario study and are usually limited to presenting short-term positive effects of preferred technological solutions.

3.4 Further Technology Assumptions

The following conclusions on technology assumptions in the different scenarios are in addition to the technology-related assumptions already evaluated and compared under *Sections 3.1 (Policy Assumptions and Targets) and 3.2 (Economic Assumptions)*:

- In all of the studies, a Baseline or Reference scenario is compared with scenarios which are more ambitious in reducing GHG-emissions. These "GHG-ambitious scenarios" mostly assume significant growth rates in RES energy sources for power generation (up to shares of e.g. 50% in the ETP Blueline and 97% in the Energy [R]evolution scenario by 2050) and agree on the main RES electricity generation technologies: onshore/offshore wind, biomass and solar-PV.
- The studies are more diverse regarding the estimations for the shares of thermal and hydro-RES: Of course, higher shares of FOS fuels are estimated in the absence of additional policies promoting RES-deployment. In the scenarios with more ambitious emission-reduction policies, gas-fired power plants often have a high relevance in serving peak-loads and load-following, due to the high shares of variable RES sources. Nuclear power plants, without restrictions on development, are often considered as a vital option to help significantly reducing GHG-emissions from power generation in a cost-effective way (e.g. ETP Blueline).
- Innovative solutions for road transport (electric vehicles, biofuels) and other new power and energy technologies are identified as crucial for future energy systems throughout the studies. Most of the studies focus on electric vehicles and biofuels besides power sector restructuring.
- The scope for biomass technology improvements to 2050 is not explored in most cases, nor is the prospect of productivity increases driven by rising demand for biomass.
- Most of the studies emphasize the importance of policies concerning end-user efficiency (residential and industrial energy demand) and some studies describe measures in this field as crucial factors in the short run (2010 to 2030) to reach the emission targets set for the long run (e.g. ETP Blueline). The proposed measures comprise the thermal integrity of buildings, heat pumps, technological development in the processes of energy-intensive industries and more energy-efficient vehicles.
- Efficiency considerations on the one hand affect end-user efficiency and on the other hand the energy transformation sector (mainly power generation). There is little information on the latter and if, the studies estimate improvements in the efficiency of traditional power generation technologies, but only small ones compared to current state of the art (e.g. in the ECF Reference efficiencies of 60 % are assumed for CCGT-plants and 50 % for coal-fired plants in 2050).
- In most scenarios except those of ECF, grid development is not modelled or optimised for the given energy mix; it is pre-determined. Given the expected burst in electrification, the role of "smart grid" technology developments, increased balancing needs and distributed generation, the assumptions about grid development equate to assumptions regarding costs and energy mixes.

Key points:

In addition to the technology-related "Key points" already presented at the end of Sections 3.1 (Policy Assumptions and Targets) and 3.2 (Economic Assumptions), the following key conclusions on technology assumptions in the different scenarios can be made:


- Most scenarios assume significant growth rates in the use of RES energy sources for power generation.
- NUC, without restrictions on development, is often considered as a vital option to help significantly reducing GHG-emissions from power generation in a cost-effective way.
- Competitiveness of CCS depends strongly on the carbon price.
- Problems in extended use of biomass needed to counter-balance future shares of intermittent wind and solar are nowhere analysed in detail.
- Estimated future investment costs are strongly influenced by chosen assumptions on technological developments in energy technologies..
- Innovative solutions for road transport (electric vehicles, biofuels) are identified as crucial for future energy systems throughout the studies.
- Most studies emphasize the importance of policies concerning end-user efficiency (residential and industrial energy demand) and some studies describe measures in this field as crucial factors in the short run to reach emission targets set for the long run.

3.5 Key Results of Scenarios

From the above modelling assumptions taken by different stakeholders, scenario models result in often different, sometimes similar projections regarding specific future trends:


- **Future primary energy demand** has to be seen in relation with the final energy demand and the technologies used. As shown in [Figure 3](#), whereas the baseline scenarios show generally slightly increasing primary energy demands, the alternative scenarios aiming at reducing GHG-emissions show generally declining demands:

[Figure 3: Development of Economy-Wide Primary Energy Demand, in PJ](#)




- As can be seen from [Figure 4](#), without new energy policies to reduce energy demand or GHG-emissions, final energy demand will increase, similar to GDP-development. With new stringent policy measures, final energy demand can be reduced by 20-25% until 2050.

[Figure 4: Development of Economy-Wide Final Energy Demand, in PJ](#)




- Compared to primary energy demand, long term developments in final energy demand are also influenced by the structure of the power generation sector (see Figure 4).
- It has to be noted, that in some cases, differences in efficiency targets may lead to major differences in projected energy demand. For example, ambitious energy efficiency measures are implemented in the Greenpeace/EREC Energy [R]evolution scenarios and in the Eurelectric Power Choices scenario, even in the medium term up to 2020. This results in significant declines of final energy demand and also primary energy demand, if measures aim at reducing energy demand of end-consumers.
- Looking at **future electricity demand**, a steady increase can be seen in all scenarios. Compared to the picture of the final energy demand, in general a substitution towards electricity can be observed. This tendency is especially relevant for scenarios with high GHG-reduction targets as these scenarios focus on decarbonisation of power generation and substitution for FOS fuels in transportation (e.g. electric vehicles) and buildings (e.g. heat pumps). Generally, this substitution process is induced through cost-optimization, either for individuals (DG ENER, Eurelectric), or for the whole region (e.g. ECF, FEEM), with the exception of the Greenpeace/EREC Energy [R]evolution scenarios. Beneath this substitution effect, electricity demand also increases due to higher income and economic activity. Figure 5 clearly shows that reductions in electricity demand due to energy-efficiency policies are outweighed by additional demand caused by the mentioned factors.

Figure 5: Development of Economy-Wide Electricity Demand, in TWh



- The **changes in electricity generation** (development as well as structure), which are shown in Figure 6 for 2050 depend on:
 - GHG and RES targets set in the scenarios,
 - competitiveness of power plants assumed differently in different scenarios (capital costs, fixed and variable O&M costs, fuel and CO2-prices),
 - pre-defined RES-targets set in "back-casting" scenarios (Greenpeace/EREC, ECF),
 - bounds set for deployment of NUC/CCS in some scenarios (Greenpeace/EREC, ECF).

Figure 6: Electricity Generation in 2050, in TWh



In the medium term, up to 2030 and especially up to 2020, differences between the alternative scenarios are relatively small. Of course, even in the medium term, differences between scenarios with emission reduction targets and reference scenarios are considerable: Ambitious scenarios generally show higher shares for RES and NUC, with diverse views on CCS, except when NUC and CCS are excluded from the beginning.

In the long term, even differences between alternative scenarios are considerable. In the Eurelectric Power Choices and the ETP Blueline scenarios, nuclear power plants are estimated to obtain a high relevance in reaching the emission reduction targets. Nuclear power plants are assumed to be the most economic option to serve baseload in these scenarios, whereas FOS-fuelled plants are mainly used for load following (gas-fired plants), with the exemption of coal-fired plants with CCS. Differences between the two scenarios could be due to slightly different geographical coverage (ETP focusing on OECD-Europe, including Norway and Switzerland, both with high RES-shares) and differences in the estimated competitiveness of CCS / FOS fuels vis-à-vis NUC and RES power generation.

Deployment of CCS is of importance for all alternative scenarios (except Energy [R]evolution where it is excluded), but significantly higher in the Power Choices scenario and the ECF-pathways. Deployment for this form of emission abatement starts typically in the period from 2020 to 2030, but is assumed to gain importance only after 2030 (ETP, ECF, Eurelectric, PLANETS). The outcomes in the basic and advanced Greenpeace/EREC Energy [R]evolution scenarios are significantly different, due to exclusion of NUC and CCS in these scenarios.

In the low carbon scenarios examined, the quantity of electricity from RES produced by 2050 ranges from 1862 TWh to 4110 TWh. Fossil fuel generated electricity deploying CCS ranges from 490 TWh to 1470. Nuclear powered electricity production ranges from 490 TWh to 2607 TWh.

Key points:

- Without new energy policies to reduce energy demand or GHG-emissions, final energy demand will increase, similar to GDP-development.
- The significant differences across scenarios on assumptions on feasibility of efficiency improvements lead to major differences in projected energy demand.
- Compared to primary energy demand, long term developments in final energy demand are also influenced by the structure of the power generation sector. Higher decreases of final energy demand in relation to primary energy demand can be achieved by a technology-neutral approach in developing future power generation mixes (i.e. resulting in higher shares for CCS and NUC).
- Electricity demand increases across all scenarios due to higher income and economic activity. Reductions due to energy-efficiency policies are outweighed by additional demand.
- If a technology-neutral approach is chosen, high prices of CO2-certificates are the main driver for deployment of both RES and NUC, but also for development of CCS. Therefore, GHG-ambitious technology-neutral scenarios generally show higher shares for RES and NUC, except when NUC and CCS are excluded from the beginning.

3.6 Models Used and Interdependencies Between Studies

In all scenario studies analysed bottom-up models are used, some of them in combination with top-down models, as summarised (for the main models) in Table 6:

Table 6: Characteristics of Models Used

Study	Models used	Type of model	Characteristic
IEA - WEO	▪ World Energy Model	▪ Bottom-up-model (with additive top-down model)	▪ Simulation
IEA - ETP	▪ ETP MARKAL/TIMES	▪ Bottom-up-model	▪ Optimization (lead costs)
EU DG TREN	▪ PRIMES	▪ Mixed representation: Bottom-up and top-down model	▪ Partial market equilibrium
ECF Roadmap	▪ a.o. McKinsey Power Generation Model	▪ Bottom-Up-Model (with additive top-down model)	▪ Simulation
Greenpeace/EREC Energy [R]evolution	▪ MESAP/PlaNet	▪ Bottom-up model	▪ Simulation
Eurelectric Power Choices	▪ PRIMES	▪ Mixed representation: Bottom-up and top-down model	▪ Partial market equilibrium

Not least because of the use of the same models by different scenario studies, a variety of studies uses the input and output of other studies.

Two main studies can be identified: IEA World Energy Outlook and DG ENER / PRIMES.

- The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives, the ECF Roadmap 2050, Eurelectric's Power Choices and Greenpeace/EREC's Energy [R]evolution use the WEO baseline.
- Input and output of the DG ENER PRIMES study are used for the Eurelectric study.

4. SUMMARY OF COMPARISON

From the comparison of stakeholder scenarios presented in this report, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- **Overall Goal:**
 - Scenarios are marked by GHG and/or RES targets and development of future energy mixes is primarily based on optimising this parameter.
 - Security of supply indicators are not created (or optimised), except for the grid-oriented modelling of ECF.
 - Competitiveness indicators are limited, partial and not optimised.
- **Basic Modelling Approaches used by Stakeholders:**
 - Models used for scenario studies can broadly be grouped into market-based optimisation models ("fore-casts") and models which use exogenously defined market shares ("back-casts").
 - If market-based optimisation is applied (i.e. a technology-neutral approach chosen), deployment of the different energy technologies (FOS, NUC, RES) mainly depends on their relative total costs.
 - Grid modelling (and its major implications) are modelled by ECF; in most other scenario analyses, they are pre-determined.
- **Energy/Electricity Demand:**
 - Without new policy measures demand will increase due to GDP growth. Final energy consumption in 2030 in low carbon scenarios range from 41000 PJ to 61000 PJ; in 2050 from 34000 PJ to 49000 PJ.
 - Electrification is assumed in (almost) all scenarios. Electricity is estimated to gain higher shares in final energy demand, especially in scenarios confronted with ambitious GHG-targets (mainly as a substitute for fossil fuels).
- **Development of More Sustainable Future Energy Systems:**
 - Most scenarios, such as those generated by the PRIMES model, optimise to determine the final energy mix ("technology neutrality"), based on cost input and technology learning assumptions. Greenpeace/EREC and the ECF scenarios backcast from several targeted generation shares, the former excluding NUC and CCS...
 - Estimated future investment costs are also strongly influenced by chosen assumptions on technological developments in energy technologies whose dependability is often difficult or impossible to verify.
 - Most scenarios seem to lack a clear consideration of the costs for necessary infrastructure changes to enable further deployment of variable RES. For example, although investments in the distribution grid seem to represent the majority of necessary grid investments and although all studies stress the

importance of smart grids, in almost all scenarios merely transmission (if at all) is considered.

- Few studies explicitly model changes in the behaviour of economic agents with regard to changes in consumer behaviour.
- Effects on the EU labour market and the economy as a whole (e.g. risk of deindustrialisation) are not consistently modelled in any scenario study.
- Electricity prices increase in most studies at least in the medium term (2030). Some studies with high emission reduction targets expect a decrease of electricity prices in the long term (up to 2050), due to lower fossil-fuel consumption.

- **Renewables:**

- Absolute and relative increases of RES in the power sector across all scenarios.
- Investment costs for RES decrease across all scenarios, especially in a long term perspective.

- **Nuclear Power:**

- When optimised purely on costs, nuclear power tends to expand and gain increasing shares.

- **Fossil fuel plants:**

- CCS plays an increasing role in scenarios with a focus on a strong future role of the carbon price.

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