

3. The abolishment of the conversion mode may have other unreasonable effects as well. Under article 10 paragraph 2 CTSP even in a case of *continued enforcement* the sentence taken over in the executing State may never exceed the local maximum for the offences proven. A similar provision cannot be found in the FWD European Enforcement Order. In cases where similar facts lead to different crimes with different maximum sentences the continued enforcement can create problems in the case of re-transferring. The home State is now obliged to execute a sentence that is higher than the national maximum in case such a crime has been committed on its territory. It is therefore recommended to bring the FWD European Enforcement Order in line with the practice under the CTSP.
4. Unlike the CTSP (article 9 paragraph 4) the FWD European Enforcement Order has no special provision with regard to *'persons who for reasons of mental condition have not been held criminally responsible for the commission of the offence'*. No information is given about the reason for this omission. Article 1 (b) however makes it clear that *'sentences'* is meant to include *'detention orders'* and the Explanatory Note on article 1 FWD European Enforcement Order makes it clear that the aforementioned category of judgments is included. Do all of the 25 Member States have more or less equivalent institutions to care for this category of *'sentencees'*? If not, what will be the consequence if the executing State is under an obligation to take over enforcement and what are the consequences for the *'sentencees'* in question? Moreover, it is very likely, that within and between the 25 Member States psychiatric and judicial ideas about this matter will vary considerably.
5. Article 9 (f) FWD European Enforcement Order does not guarantee that the person *necessarily knew* about time and place of the court session (e.g. in case of formal public notification for example) and consequently did not have the opportunity to defend himself in person or by counsel of his own choice (article 6 ECHR). The text should read *'or informed personally in some other way'* in order to safeguard his right to be present at the session or having himself represented by counsel. Some other problems may occur. The last sentence of article 9 can only reasonably refer to a guilty plea before a judge and not to any other statement or before any other instance. Even in a case of a guilty plea before a judge a problem may arise. This problem occurs in case of appeal. If the defendant has not been put in a position to make an appearance in appeal it remains insecure whether he knew the outcome.
6. Some Member States acknowledge double (EU) nationality. *'Permanently resident'* is a term not defined or explained in the FWD European Enforcement Order. This may easily result in difficulties and conflicts. How long should a legal residency have lasted to be accepted as *'permanent'*? There is no rule of precedence provided in the FWD European Enforcement Order. This leaves it entirely to the discretion of the sentencing State to which State the sentencee will be returned.
7. The consent of the sentenced person⁴ (and both States) is no longer obligatory under the FWD European Enforcement Order for transferring a person. The FWD European Enforcement Order also contains no obligation for the sentencing State to issue an enforcement order. This may frustrate one of the aims of the system: promoting the person's social rehabilitation.
8. The FWD European Enforcement Order gives only a basic duty for the executing State to execute the Enforcement order. Article 2 paragraph 1 of the CTSP states: *'the parties undertake to afford each other the widest measure of cooperation in respect of the transfer (...)'*. The weak point in the CTSP is, even with regard to the *guaranteed conversion* mode, that the sentencing State has a habit of procrastination. It may take up to half a year after the final sentence before transfer takes place and it might take years because of the lack of such a guarantee. The FWD European Enforcement Order prescribes nothing to solve this problem. The sentencing State is free in its decision for the moment of instigating the transfer and is also free in choosing the State where the person will be transferred to. This is a serious shortcoming of the FWD European Enforcement Order and it is not explained why this is not taken into account. But if and when the decision to transfer is taken, the executing State is practically bound and must take its decision within three weeks. This is a lop-sided solution. Not even a fast re-transfer after

³ 'or if the person has not indicated to a competent authority that he or she does not contest the case'

⁴ Consent before transferring maintains a condition for persons who have other close links with the executing State (article 4 paragraph 1). Another example where consent remains necessary can be found in article 9 paragraph 1 (f).

surrendering a national is regulated. There should at least be a strict rule regulating re-transfer, if a guarantee to that effect has been given, immediately after a sentence has become final.

9. Article 13 paragraphs 3 and 4 FWD European Enforcement Order regulates *conditional release*. Some Member States may not only have rules for *conditional release* but also rules for *good-conduct and/or work-rebates*. At present there is no reliable overview of this sort of the national rules in the 25 Member States. The rule of article 13 paragraph 3 may be to the detriment of the sentencee if the sentencing State has more lenient rules and the States concerned reach no agreement. More serious problems are caused by the rule of article 13 paragraph 4. There is a serious risk that the sentenced person will end in a worse position. In contrast, under article 13 paragraph 4 FWD European Enforcement Order only those provisions of the sentencing State may be taken into account 'under which the person is *entitled* to conditional release *at a specified point in time*'. This is a harsh restriction since conditional release is seldom a thing the sentencee is 'entitled' to. In some States a decision of an *execution-judge* is necessary, where all sorts of circumstances are taken into account. It is also clear from this paragraph that other possible rebates cannot be taken into account. Under the *conversion mode* it is good practice to take into account all possible rebates the sentencee will loose by being transferred in a best case scenario. Otherwise there is a serious risk the person ends in a worse position which of course is counter-productive to the purpose of rehabilitation as well as highly unreasonable and in conflict with article 11 of the CTSP⁵.

A positive point

The FWD European Enforcement Order partly covers the rules applying when a national is surrendered to stand trial in another Member State with a *guarantee* to be retransferred if sentenced (article 3 paragraph 2). From the fact that article 7 FWD European Enforcement Order is not applicable in such a case (article 3 paragraph 3 (a)) it is, we hope, to be understood that the abolishment of the double incrimination does not apply in such cases. It is not entirely clear however, because article 7 covers more than the 'list' alone. It also covers (paragraph 3) the facts where double incrimination may still be made a condition. Moreover under the Framework decision concerning the European Arrest Warrant there is an obligation to surrender nationals with regard to 'listed' facts, where the double incrimination has been abolished. If double incrimination is indeed still required it solves the *ordre public* problem for States where sentences cannot be enforced with regard to facts not locally punishable.

Conclusion

The idea to regulate the procedure to transfer sentenced person to their 'Home' country in order to facilitate their social rehabilitation is a sound one. However, the way it has been given form in the Draft is highly problematic. The abolition of the *conversion mode* may not lead to ethical problems in case a person has *wilfully* decided to commit a crime abroad, but there may well be such a problem if the *locus acti* is just a *coincidence* (e.g. a couple on holiday abroad, quarrelling in such a fierce manner that one of them ends up dead). When a person is surrendered only for streamlining proceedings and his own State has jurisdiction as well, it could turn out rather unfair when it is not possible to convert his sentence into a sentence according to the level of his home country. As long as there is no obligation for the sentencing State to transfer, the Draft Framework Decision looks more like an instrument giving that State the opportunity to get rid of people they consider a nuisance, rather than an instrument offering the best way for sentencees to rehabilitate in their own habitat.

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⁵ Article 11 paragraph 1 (d): 'Shall not aggravate the penal position of the sentenced person, and shall not be bound by any minimum which the law of the administering State may provide for the offence or offences committed.'